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MERRITT B. FOX† 
ABSTRACT 
  The public offering of truly new securities involves purchases by 
investors in sufficient number and in small enough blocks that each 
purchaser’s shares can reasonably be expected to be freely tradable in 
a secondary market that did not exist before the offering. Increasing the 
ability of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to make such 
offerings has been the subject of much recent discussion.  
  At the time that a firm initially contemplates such an offering, 
unusually large information asymmetries exist between its insiders and 
potential investors. These can lead to severe adverse-selection problems 
that prevent a substantial portion of worthy offerings from being 
successfully marketed. A regime relying solely on market-based 
antidotes to this problem—signaling, underwriter reputation, and 
accountant certification—and backed only by liability for intentional 
affirmative misrepresentation will fall well short of being a solution. 
This shortfall suggests a role for regulation. 
  This Article goes back to first principles to determine the proper 
content of such regulation. The relevant questions include: What 
should issuers be required to disclose at the time of the offering and 
thereafter? Under what circumstances should various offering 
participants be liable for damages if, at the time of the offering, there 
were misstatements or omissions? And should this regime be 
mandatory or optional? The answers are then used to critically evaluate 
a number of recent U.S. reforms aimed at increasing SME offerings by 
lessening regulatory burdens. These include Securities Act Rule 506(c), 
Regulation A+, and the new crowdfunding rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world of public securities offerings can be divided sharply into 
two archetypical categories. One relates to offerings by established 
issuers of securities that are identical to securities already trading in 
liquid, efficient secondary markets. The other relates to public 
offerings by issuers new to the market whose securities are not already 
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trading in some kind of secondary market. This Article lays out some 
first principles with regard to this second kind of public offering.1 As 
the term is used here, an offering is “public” if a large enough group of 
portfolio investors each purchases a small enough block of securities 
that the amount purchased can be reasonably expected to be freely 
tradable subsequently in some kind of a secondary market.2 Thus, for 
example, under U.S. law, an offering involving a general solicitation 
made pursuant to the provisions of Rule 506(c)3 could be a public 
offering, even though it does not require registration under the 
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).4 The same can be said of an 
offering made under Regulation A+.5 
The first category—offerings of securities of a type already trading 
in a liquid, efficient market—was the focus of much regulatory concern 
and reform in the three preceding decades, starting with the integrated 
disclosure and short-form registration reforms in the 1980s and 
culminating with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
2005 Offering Reforms,6 which included automatic shelf registration 
for offerings of well-known seasoned issuers. The current decade has 
seen a shift in the focus of regulatory reform to the second  
category—offerings of truly new securities. A number of factors have 
been driving this change in focus. One relates to an increased concern 
with promoting innovation to stimulate the rate of economic growth. 
This concern is combined with the belief that potential early investors 
 
 1. For a parallel effort with respect to the first category of transactions, see generally 
Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2009) 
[hereinafter Fox, Civil Liability] (discussing disclosure obligations of established issuers and the 
structure of liabilities for their breach). 
 2. There are, of course, many offerings that may be in need of regulation but that do not 
fall neatly into one of these two categories. One example would be an offering where there is 
secondary trading already in identical securities, but the secondary market cannot be properly 
described as liquid and efficient. Another example would be an offering where there is no 
secondary trading prior to the offering and one cannot reasonably expect such trading to develop 
after the offering, given the limited number of purchasers purchasing relatively small blocks. Such 
situations have been subject to cogent analysis elsewhere by Professors Donald Langevoort and 
Robert Thompson. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 372 (2013). Still, a 
significant portion of all new issues of securities does fall into one of the two archetypical 
categories set out here.  
 3. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015). 
 4. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(b) (2012). 
 5. 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260 (2015). 
 6. See generally Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange 
Act Release No. 52,026, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 
3, 2005). 
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in innovative new companies will be more willing to commit funds if 
they anticipate that a public-offering exit for their investments will be 
available in the future if the firm succeeds.7 Another relates to worries, 
arising since the 2008–2009 financial crisis, that small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) have been having greater difficulty obtaining 
bank financing because banks are cutting back on lending to repair 
their balance sheets and meet new capital requirements.8 In the wake 
of the crisis, there is also interest in restoring, on a sounder basis than 
before, residential mortgage securitizations, another type of truly new 
securities offering. 
In response, there have been a variety of reforms, some already 
implemented and others just recently proposed, aimed at promoting 
public offerings of truly new securities. Many of these actual or 
proposed reforms grow out of provisions of the JOBS Act9 and the 
FAST Act10 and the SEC’s efforts at their implementation. These 
reforms, in one way or another, ease or entirely eliminate the burdens 
that the Securities Act registration process imposes on the various 
participants in the offering at the time that it occurs and that the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934’s (Exchange Act) continuing-
disclosure requirements impose on the issuer thereafter.11 This easing 
can take the form of reducing or eliminating what is required to be 
disclosed. It can involve reducing or eliminating previously imposed 
restrictions on communications or on the timing of the transaction. It 
can also take the form of reducing the likelihood of litigation by 
altering the standard of liability applicable to participants in the 
offering if sued by purchasers claiming to have been damaged by a 
material misstatement or omission during the offering process. The 
effort across the Atlantic to create a new European capital market 
 
 7. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital 
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 266 (1999). 
 8. See Gert Wehinger, Bank Deleveraging, the Move from Bank to Market-Based Financing, 
and SME Financing, OECD J., Jan. 2012, at 65, 68–70. 
 9. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-06, § 302(a), 126 Stat. 306, 
315 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012)). 
 10. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, §§ 71001–
71003, 129 Stat. 1312, 1784 (2015) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77f (Supp. III 2015)). 
 11. See generally Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-
Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (2013) 
(discussing the impact of loosening regulations from the JOBS Act and other reforms on early-
stage capital raising). 
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reflects similar concerns,12 as do efforts in emerging economies such as 
Brazil to connect SMEs with the capital markets.13 
Much of the discussion of these reforms has taken place without a 
frame of reference. Reform proponents have tended to tell an overly 
simple story. In the U.S. discussion, for example, the starting point is 
the clearly correct proposition that the burdens imposed by the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, because of their fixed-costs 
aspects, fall particularly heavily on smaller firms. The proponents then 
go on to argue that more offerings by such firms are a good thing and 
thus these burdens should be lightened for them. Reform opponents 
have a simple story as well. They simply fear that reducing the burdens 
will result in more investors putting up good money and later, unfairly, 
having nothing to show for it.  
This Article seeks to add rigor to the debate. Absent regulation, 
the determination of which public offerings go forward and succeed at 
raising funds, and which do not, is determined by tort law and the 
market-determined terms of contracts into which offering participants 
enter. The issue is whether, and, if so, under what circumstances, 
government regulation should be added to the mix. Such regulation can 
help determine what should be disclosed both at the time of the 
offering and thereafter. It can also determine the circumstances under 
which various offering participants should be held liable for damages 
if, at the time of the offering, there were misstatements or omissions of 
required disclosures. This Article goes back to first principles as a guide 
to answering these questions from the points of view of promoting 
efficiency and fairness.  
Any time an issuer first contemplates a public offering of truly new 
securities, the information asymmetries between persons associated 
with the issuer and potential investors are particularly large because, 
unlike an established issuer whose securities are trading in an efficient 
market, much less is typically known about the issuer and the persons 
associated with it. Also, there is no price in the secondary trading 
market to serve as some kind of valuation of the securities being 
offered. These two observations are relatively self-evident, but they 
 
 12. See generally Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 468 final 
(Sept. 30, 2015) (discussing reforms to increase financing for European SMEs). 
 13. INT’L GROWTH & EMERGING MKTS. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC.  
COMM’RS, SME FINANCING THROUGH CAPITAL MARKETS 62 (2015), https://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD493.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL88-SZBK]. 
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have several less obvious implications that are important to answering 
the basic questions posed here.  
First, the presence of these information asymmetries can lead to a 
severe adverse-selection problem.14 This problem will prevent a 
substantial portion of worthy offerings from being successfully 
marketed unless, as an antidote, investors are made confident that 
issuers are providing a certain level of credible disclosure at the time 
of the offering. A regime relying solely on market-based antidotes to 
these problems—signaling, underwriter reputation, and accountant or 
credit-rating certification—and backed only by liability for intentional 
affirmative misrepresentation is, in many circumstances, not a 
sufficient solution. More specifically, the larger the number of offerees, 
the lesser their financial sophistication, and the smaller the absolute 
number of dollars each is likely to invest, the less likely it is that such a 
regime will be an adequate solution. One option is for the government 
or a respected private entity to offer to issuers a regime that requires 
them to make certain disclosures but to make its adoption optional so 
that similarly situated issuers not adopting the regime would still be 
allowed to make offerings. For a variety of reasons, however, this is 
unlikely to be a complete solution to the problem. 
Second, the adverse-selection problem will not be solved by 
disclosure rules alone. There must be appropriately negative 
consequences for untruthful or incomplete answers. As the 
consequences become more severe, however, not only are more 
unworthy offerings blocked, fewer worthy offerings go ahead as well. 
Getting the balance right requires a focus on what kind of liability—
strict, strict with a due-diligence defense, or negligence—should be 
imposed on issuers, on underwriters and others in the distribution 
process, and on accountants and other certifiers to deter dishonesty 
and to assure the optimal level of care by each.  
Third, the severity of the adverse-selection problem at the time of 
a public offering of truly new securities can also be ameliorated by the 
prospect of a certain level of ongoing periodic disclosure thereafter. 
This is because the ongoing-disclosure regime, through a variety of 
mechanisms, improves an issuer’s corporate governance discipline. 
This in turn renders less important the fact that, at time of the offering, 
 
 14. Adverse selection occurs when a potential market participant with a high-quality offering 
decides not to enter the market because persons on the other side of the market cannot distinguish 
it from participants with lower-quality offerings. For a more detailed discussion of this concept, 
see infra Part I.  
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investors typically know relatively less about the intentions and 
abilities of the managers of issuers of truly new securities compared to 
what they know with respect to established issuers trading in efficient 
liquid markets.  
Finally, a public offering of truly new securities is not a silver bullet 
for the capital-raising problems of all firms that, up until this point, 
have been privately held. A public offering can benefit society by 
providing an issuer with a promising investment project not just 
funding but a critical gateway to getting its securities publicly traded. 
Publicly traded securities are more valuable because they are more 
liquid. A public offering can also do harm, however, by providing an 
issuer seeking to implement an unpromising investment project with a 
route by which to fund it, thereby squandering society’s scarce savings 
that could otherwise go to a more worthwhile project. Appropriate 
attention to the first principles discussed here can help design a 
regulatory system that can improve the terms of the tradeoff between 
these potential benefits and harms. The hard reality, though, is that 
there are considerable economies of scale involved in complying with 
such a regime. This means that there will be a size of issuer and a size 
of offering below which such offerings become too expensive to be 
worthwhile even if the regime is at the optimal point on the frontier of 
this tradeoff. Not every company with a worthy new real investment 
project is a good candidate for a public offering. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the especially 
severe information-asymmetry problem that plagues primary offerings 
of truly new securities. As a result, the market for such securities can 
partially or totally unravel. Part II considers market-based solutions for 
these problems—signaling, investment bank intermediation, expert 
certification, and buyer search—as well as the shortcomings of 
exclusive reliance on such solutions. Part III considers the rationale for 
having, as a further antidote to the adverse-selection problem, a 
government-designed affirmative-disclosure regime, whereby an issuer 
making an offering is required to answer certain questions. It addresses 
as well the question of whether this regime should be imposed on all 
issuers making such offerings or only those that volunteer to be 
subjected to it. Part IV considers the rationale, under either such 
regime, for mandating the imposition of liability on issuers, issuer 
directors and officers, underwriters, dealers, and experts such as 
accountants or rating agencies when there have been material 
misstatements or material omissions of what was required to be 
disclosed. It considers as well, for each of these potential defendants, 
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the appropriate standards for imposing such liability with regard to 
questions of fault and due diligence and to burdens of evidentiary 
persuasion. Part V applies the preceding discussion to reforms 
intended to ease the burdens associated with offerings by smaller, new 
corporate issuers and considers as a general matter the role that the 
size of the issuer and the offering should play in the strictness of 
offering regulation.   
I.  THE INFORMATION-ASYMMETRY PROBLEM 
When an issuer first contemplates making a public offering of truly 
new securities, there exist particularly large information asymmetries. 
This is a very different situation from a public offering by an 
established issuer that trades in a liquid, efficient market and has a 
publicly known track record over a period of time. Potential investors 
in an offering by an issuer of truly new securities are likely to have little 
knowledge of the issuer’s past performance, if indeed it has one, and of 
the capabilities of the issuer’s managers. Potential investors are also 
unlikely to have much knowledge of the inclination, if any, of the 
issuer’s managers, or of any remaining control shareholders, to divert 
issuer cash flows to themselves after the offering. There is also no price 
in the secondary trading market, which, for an established issuer, is, 
according to the efficient-market hypothesis, an unbiased evaluation of 
the offered securities based on all publicly available information. The 
existence of this severe information asymmetry can lead to adverse-
selection problems that, absent an antidote, will lead to many worthy 
offerings being saleable only at prices so low that making the offering 
will not be worthwhile to the issuer and its control shareholders.  
A. Adverse Selection in Markets Generally 
Before considering information-asymmetry models specifically 
focused on markets for securities, it is helpful to review briefly some 
more general models that relate to all markets. To understand the basic 
problem posed by asymmetric information, consider a competitive 
market where some potential sellers are prepared to sell what they 
know to be a high-quality version of a product and others are prepared 
to sell what they know to be a low-quality version. The product’s 
quality is not observable to potential buyers and none of the buyers 
know which sellers are high quality and which are low quality. As 
Professor George Akerlof showed in his classic 1970 article concerning 
adverse selection (or the “lemons problem”), if nothing alters this 
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asymmetric-information situation, the low-quality version of the 
product can drive the high-quality version out of the market.15  
To illustrate, assume, for example, that the buyers know that 50 
percent of the sellers are offering the high-quality version and 50 
percent the low-quality version. Assume that if both kinds of sellers 
were offering the product in the market and, contrary to the facts as I 
am setting them out, the buyers knew the quality of what they were 
buying, the market-clearing price would be one hundred dollars for the 
high-quality version and eighty dollars for the low-quality version. 
Assume also that the market is competitive: the quantity sold by any 
given seller or purchased by any given buyer will not affect price. Given 
that buyers in fact do not know the quality of the product being offered 
by any of the sellers, rational buyers would pay all sellers ninety dollars 
per item. This would be the expected value of a purchase because there 
would be a 50 percent chance it was from a high-quality seller and a 50 
percent chance that it was from a low-quality seller. This result would 
not be an equilibrium solution, however. Suppose, for example, that 
the high-quality sellers’ reservation price—the cost to them of parting 
with their goods—is anything greater than ninety dollars. Under these 
circumstances, the potential high-quality sellers would not enter the 
market in the first place. The buyers would then know that only the 
low-quality version would be available and the product would be 
priced accordingly. This information asymmetry would cause a loss in 
economic welfare. If everyone were fully informed, there would have 
been transactions in the high-quality version of the good between 
willing buyers and sellers. Their mutual willingness to enter into the 
transactions would have shown that they each expected to gain from 
doing so. The absence of their opportunities to do so means the loss of 
these expected gains. 
B. Application in Securities Markets 
In the seminal adverse-selection model with respect to securities, 
Professors Stewart Myers and Nicholas Majluf demonstrate that a firm 
with what its insiders know is a profitable, positive net present value 
(NPV) real investment project16 proposal may pass up implementing 
 
 15. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 491–93 (1970). 
 16. An investment project’s NPV equals its expected future net revenues discounted to 
present value less the project’s cost. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & 
FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 85–89 (8th ed. 2006).  
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the project if new securities must be issued to finance it.17 The securities 
of such a firm are the high-quality version of the product discussed 
above. The market cannot distinguish them from the securities of firms 
with less promising projects. The market thus prices the securities of 
all the firms in the pool at a lower price reflecting the average expected 
return for the total pool. This lower pooling-equilibrium price per 
security would require the firm with the positive NPV project, in order 
to raise enough cash to finance its implementation, to issue more 
securities than if they could be sold at a higher price. Issuing more 
securities obliges the firm to pay more in expected future dividends or 
interest. The project, despite being more promising than most, may still 
not generate sufficient expected cash flow to justify these greater 
expected obligations, in which case the issuer will not make the 
offering. Unless another form of financing can be found, society will 
lose because scarce savings will go instead to a less promising project. 
Now imagine a range of potential issuers in terms of their share 
qualities, with the worst having shares that would be worth nothing to 
anyone purchasing them because of some mix of poor expected 
underlying cash flow and diversions by control shareholders. The 
highest-quality issuers, as described just above, would not enter the 
market in the first place. But now the next-highest-quality issuers 
would be in the same position as the highest-quality issuers would have 
been if they had stayed in the market. This is because the price offered 
to these next-highest-quality issuers would be an average of the 
expected value of their shares and the values of the shares of all the 
lower-quality issuers. So now these next-highest-quality issuers would 
not enter the market. Moving down the list in terms of the quality of 
an issuer’s shares, this story can be repeated again and again. In the 
end, in the absence of any antidotes to this adverse-selection problem, 
the market unravels completely, just like the high-quality product in 
the example in the initial discussion of adverse selection,18 and there 
are no share offerings to portfolio investors.  
 
 17. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 187 (1984). A 
positive NPV project is one where the project’s cost is less than the expected future net revenues 
from the project discounted to present value at a rate of market return for cash flows with 
comparable risk. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 16, at 17. Because this market rate of 
return represents the opportunity cost of implementing the project, implementing the project 
enhances economic welfare in society. 
 18. See supra Part I.A.  
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In the real world, when a market for offerings by a given type of 
issuer just opens, there may be an initial burst of irrational exuberance 
such that the full impact of adverse selection may not be felt 
immediately. As a result, a number of unworthy, as well as worthy, 
offerings will succeed in being marketed.19 Over time, though, many of 
the issuers of the unworthy offerings will not perform well for reasons 
that were known at the time of the offering but not disclosed. Thus, 
even if the rational-actor assumption in the adverse-selection model 
described above is not fully correct, without some kind of antidote to 
the information asymmetries, the unraveling of the market that it 
predicts will happen eventually.20  
C. The Additional Problem of No Guidance from Secondary-Market 
Prices 
It is important to see that this adverse-selection problem is much 
more severe in the case of a possible offering of truly new securities 
compared to an offering by an established issuer whose identical 
securities are already trading in an efficient secondary market. The 
potential investor in an offering by an established issuer of this type has 
the guidance of the price in the secondary market, which, because the 
market is efficient, is as good an estimate as can be obtained of the 
security’s value based on publicly available information.21 Thus she can 
be confident that the price she pays in the offering, if it is close to the 
secondary-market price, is, in terms of what is publicly known, fair and 
unbiased even if she personally obtains none of this information. In 
contrast, there is no price to provide such guidance in the case of the 
offering by the issuer of the truly new security. Thus the rational 
investor, before contemplating a purchase in a public offering of truly 
 
 19. See Robert Forsythe, Russell Lundholm & Thomas Rietz, Cheap Talk, Fraud, and 
Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 481, 
482–85 (1999) (discussing experimental evidence that investors will credit false claims not policed 
by tough sanctions so that the signaling model will fail).  
 20. The German effort to facilitate public offerings by SMEs by setting up a new market with 
less stringent requirements for initial public offerings (IPOs) is an illustration of the problem. It 
had initial success followed by collapse. See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana 
Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the 
United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 502–07 (2011); Hans-Peter Burghof 
& Adrian Hunger, Access to Stock Markets for Small and Medium Sized Growth Firms: The 
Temporary Success and Ultimate Failure of Germany’s Neuer Markt 4 (Oct. 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=497404 [https://perma.cc/G3WM-3DNL].  
 21. The efficient-market hypothesis from financial economics holds that the prices of 
securities of large, established issuers trading in liquid markets fully reflect all publicly available 
information. See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 16, at 337–41.  
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new securities, must either acquire and analyze this information herself 
or rely on an advisor who does this for her. And if this information is 
not conveniently available to her or her advisor in a credible and easily 
usable fashion, the market for such an offering is even further 
handicapped relative to the market for an offering by an established 
issuer.22  
D. The Social-Welfare Challenge Posed by Information Asymmetries 
To understand the economic-welfare implications of the 
information asymmetries discussed above, engage in a brief thought 
experiment that contrasts two hypothetical worlds. They share in 
common that public offerings of truly new securities are the only way 
of funding proposed new real investment projects, but they differ 
sharply as to who knows what.  
The first is a nirvana world with no information asymmetries. In 
such a world, everyone’s expectations concerning a possible new 
offering would be based on the aggregation of all bits of information 
that initially are known by anyone in the world. Funds would find their 
way from investors to real investment projects in every instance where 
it was mutually advantageous for this to happen. Every offering would, 
based on all known information, be priced properly. In the process, the 
economy’s most promising proposed real investment projects would be 
implemented going down the list in rank order to the point where 
society’s scarce savings were exhausted. 
The second is a world with the large information asymmetries that 
exist in the real world when an issuer first contemplates making a 
public offering of truly new securities. Unlike the real world, however, 
these asymmetries are not ameliorated by any market-based antidotes 
or regulatory interventions, nor are there alternative mechanisms for 
allocating scarce savings to proposed real investment projects. As 
described above, the market for offerings of truly new securities would 
unravel completely.23 There would be no real investment because there 
would be no way for savers and proponents of new real investment 
 
 22. In contrast, for registered public offerings of large, established issuers in the United 
States, the issuer need make available to prospective investors only a brief prospectus, under the 
theory that the efficient-market hypothesis assures that all publicly available information is 
reflected in the securities’ secondary-market trading price. See Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, 
at 243–45, 243 n.10. 
 23. See supra Part I.B. 
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projects to connect. As a result, there would be a huge shortfall in 
economic welfare in comparison to the first world. 
The task then is to design a financial system that minimizes this 
economic-welfare shortfall. We need to move as far as possible from 
the second world toward a system that allocates society’s scarce savings 
among all the proposed real investment projects in the economy in the 
way it would be allocated in the first world. To do so in a cost-effective 
way, however, we need to take account of the fact that all mechanisms 
of allocating savings to fund real investment projects consume real 
resources as they deal with the problems posed by the initial 
information asymmetries.  
In thinking about such a system, the first thing to note is that public 
offerings of truly new securities are not in fact the only mechanism by 
which scarce savings are allocated to proposed real investment 
projects. There are a variety of institutions, ranging from commercial 
banks, insurance companies, and investment banks to investment funds 
including venture capital, that provide debt and equity financing 
privately. Existing issuers can also finance projects from their internal 
cash flows. Existing publicly traded issuers can make public offerings 
of securities identical to what is already trading in the market. Given 
that there is a tradeoff between the costs of dealing with initial 
information-asymmetry problems and the capacity of a financial 
channel to find the most promising real investment opportunities, for 
many proposed projects, one or more of these other mechanisms for 
deciding funding is superior to a public offering of truly new securities.  
Nevertheless, there are promising proposed projects for which 
such an offering is the best funding vehicle and that will not be funded 
if this vehicle is not available. There are multiple reasons for this. A 
claim on a dollar of future expected cash flow is more valuable if it is 
publicly traded than if it is not because it is more liquid and can easily 
be included in a risk-reducing diversified portfolio.24 Moreover, the 
public market for new issues of securities seems more sensitive to the 
potentialities of innovative proposed investment projects than internal 
funding by existing, established publicly traded firms.25 
 
 24. See, e.g., William L. Silber, Discounts on Restricted Stock: The Impact of Illiquidity on 
Stock Prices, 47 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 60, 60, 62 (1991) (“Companies issuing restricted stock alongside 
registered securities trading in the open market usually offer a price discount on the restricted 
securities to compensate for their relative illiquidity.”).  
 25. See generally Merritt B. Fox, Promoting Innovation: The Law of Publicly Traded 
Corporations, 5 CAPITALISM & SOC’Y 1 (2010) (arguing that the diversity of potential providers 
of funds in an IPO and of the information channels by which they become informed makes this 
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Thus, there will be a significant loss in economic welfare to the 
extent that adverse selection prevents the market for public offerings 
of truly new securities from functioning. Minimizing this loss is what 
prompts the discussion that follows.   
II.  MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS TO ADVERSE-SELECTION 
PROBLEMS 
This Part considers the extent to which market-based antidotes to 
the adverse-selection problem would, by themselves, allow a market 
for truly new securities to function. The only parts of the legal system 
on which these antidotes rely are contract and tort law. There are a 
number of such antidotes: signaling, investment bank intermediation, 
expert certification, and reliance on the search by other buyers. In the 
discussion that follows, it is useful, before considering models 
specifically focused on markets for securities, to return to the example 
of the high- and low-quality products used above to explain adverse 
selection.  
A. Signaling 
One market-based antidote to adverse selection—captured by 
signaling models in information economics26—starts with the 
assumption that the potential sellers of the high-quality version of a 
product can credibly and economically communicate the quality of 
what they are selling to the market. The sellers of the low-quality 
version might stay silent. But, because it would be disadvantageous for 
any seller of the high-quality version not to affirmatively communicate 
the quality of what it is selling, buyers would infer that any seller that 
remains silent is selling the low-quality version. The credibility of a 
seller’s claim of high quality depends on the negative consequences 
that it would suffer should its claim prove to be untrue. These negative 
consequences could be in the form of legal liability or a loss in 
reputation.  
Modifying our earlier example involving the high-quality and low-
quality versions of a product, all the sellers of the high-quality product 
assert that their product is high quality and none of the sellers of the 
low-quality product do. Buyers can tell which is which and will be 
 
form of external finance more receptive to innovative investment proposals than is the case with 
internal finance). 
 26. The seminal article is Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973). 
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willing to pay one hundred dollars for the high-quality product, thus 
assuring that it will be available in the market. 
Signaling will fail to eliminate the information-asymmetry 
problem, however, if a seller’s claim of high quality is not completely 
credible. This will happen if buyers believe that a low-quality seller’s 
expected gain from falsely claiming to be high quality can in some 
circumstances exceed its expected cost. Signaling will also partially or 
totally fail if buyers believe that a high-quality seller might sometimes 
stay silent because there may be a cost to the seller of some other kind 
in making the truthful claim of high quality. This cost might be greater 
than the gain in terms of avoiding an adverse-selection discount. 
The concept that signaling can be an antidote for adverse selection 
in securities markets was first worked out in a model by Professor 
Stephen Ross.27 Ross considers the situation where there is a hierarchy 
of issuers with respect to a particular factor that could affect each of 
their respective future cash flows. The issuer with the most favorable 
situation with regard to this factor discloses this fact. In doing so, it 
distinguishes itself from all the others, none of which can truthfully 
claim that its situation is that favorable. The issuer with the next most 
favorable situation discloses this fact so that market knows that, 
although its situation is not as favorable as the first firm, it is more 
favorable than all the remaining firms. This scenario repeats itself all 
the way down the ladder. The issuer with the least favorable situation 
may stay silent, but the market will infer from its silence that it is at the 
bottom of the hierarchy.  
For a number of reasons, however, this sort of signaling is not 
likely to be a complete cure for information asymmetries in securities 
markets. To start, silence is not a complete substitute for affirmatively 
disclosing a lack of good news, because the market knows that there 
are reasons other than a lack of good news why an issuer would choose 
to remain silent. For example, a corporate issuer may choose not to 
disclose certain information, even if favorable, because revealing it to 
the market makes it available to competitors, major suppliers, and 
major customers in ways that would be damaging to the profitability of 
the issuer’s business.28 Also, the silence of an issuer concerning a 
 
 27. See generally Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications 
of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 
(Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979) (synthesizing various disclosure issues and formulating an 
economic framework within which disclosure issues can be examined). 
 28. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 687 (1984).  
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certain factor at most only conveys that its situation is less favorable 
than that of the issuers that do disclose something concerning the 
matter. Silence does not convey how much less favorable. Thus, 
disaster might be looming but the market is unaware.29  
Signaling also only works if the buyers whose actions set the price 
are attentive to the absence of disclosure on a topic and are 
sophisticated in the inferences that they draw from this silence. This 
may describe the situation in the case of a public offering by an 
established issuer whose identical securities shares trade in a liquid, 
efficient secondary market. In this situation, the secondary-market 
price is determined by “smart money” traders, and the secondary-
market price, in turn, is the primary determinant of the price in the 
issuer’s new public offering. It may also describe the situation in the 
case of a private offering to a limited number of financially 
sophisticated persons who are each making a substantial investment.30 
It does not describe well a public offering of truly new securities. 
B. Intermediation 
A second way that the asymmetric-information problem may be 
ameliorated is through the intermediation of a merchant that purchases 
the items for resale, reliably identifies which items are high-quality 
versions of the product and which are low-quality ones, and credibly 
communicates the quality of what it resells to the buyers. The merchant 
can profit from doing this by obtaining part or all of the gains from 
trade from the sale of the high-quality version. In our ongoing product 
 
 29. Commentators have noted that, for this kind of reason, reality does not conform with 
signaling theory’s prediction that voluntary disclosure will result in the market being fully 
informed. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 745 (1984); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a 
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 5–7 n.24 (1983). Coffee points out that 
the market was not able, from the silence of the issuers involved, even to begin to infer in advance 
that New York City and the Washington Public Power System would each experience disastrous 
defaults. Coffee, supra, at 745. These were the two largest defaults of publicly issued securities in 
the history of the United States, but the issuers, as municipal entities, were exempt from the 
mandatory-disclosure system under the federal securities laws. See Ann Judith Gellis, Mandatory 
Disclosure for Municipal Securities: A Reevaluation, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 15, 18–19, 40–44 (1987). 
 30. Commentators have suggested that this concern explains the distinction that the 
Securities Act and the SEC make between public offerings of securities, where registration 
involving mandatory affirmative disclosure is required, and certain offerings that are limited to 
more sophisticated investors that are exempted from such registration. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, 
ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 94, 96 (1994). As is 
discussed more in Part IV, infra, although this rationale might explain some kind of limited 
offering exemption from registration, it does not explain the breadth of the current exemption. 
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example, these gains from trade would be the difference between the 
high-quality sellers’ reservation price and the one hundred dollars that 
the buyers would be willing to pay.31  
The intermediating merchant’s claim of high quality could have 
greater credibility than that of the seller because the merchant is better 
capitalized and hence is more likely to be able to pay if it is sued for 
making a false claim. The greater credibility could also be because the 
intermediating merchant, as a more frequent player than the seller, has 
developed a more substantial reputation for telling the truth than has 
the seller, which in turn makes costlier the loss in reputation that would 
result from falsely claiming that a product is high quality when it is not. 
Underwriters perform this intermediating merchant function with 
securities. Standard models of the role of underwriters of publicly 
offered corporate equities and bonds suggest that they use their 
reputation to certify that the offering price fairly reflects what is known 
by the issuer’s insiders but not known, or at least not known for sure, 
by the market.32 The asymmetry between the insiders and the market 
may arise because potential investors are not sure that the issuer has 
disclosed all relevant negative information possessed by insiders. It 
may also arise because the insiders know positive information but do 
not disclose it publicly out of concern that to do so would inform 
competitors, suppliers, customers, or regulators in ways that would 
harm the issuer. Or it may be that the insiders truthfully disclose 
positive information but investors do not find their disclosure fully 
credible because it might also be in the interests of these insiders to 
make such a disclosure when it is not true.  
In a firm-commitment underwriting, the underwriter engages in a 
due-diligence investigation of the issuer. Then, as a frequent repeat 
player whose credibility is developed over time, it “leases” its 
reputation to the issuer by purchasing, and then reselling, the securities 
on the basis of the issuer’s disclosures. These models suggest that an 
underwriter engages in due diligence to the extent that, at the margin, 
the cost of doing so equals the benefit to its reputation in terms of its 
ongoing capacity to reduce the adverse-selection-induced discount 
imposed by the market on the future offerings that it underwrites.33  
 
 31. See Akerlof, supra note 15, at 496. 
 32. See James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith, II, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the 
Certification Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261, 261–65 (1986); Ann E. Sherman, Underwriter 
Certification and the Effect of Shelf Registration on Due Diligence, 28 FIN. MGMT. J. 5, 5–7 (1999). 
 33. Booth & Smith, supra note 32, at 267. 
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The effectiveness of this mechanism in ameliorating information 
asymmetry has its limits, however. An underwriter has difficulty 
designing an optimal incentive scheme for its agents. On the one hand, 
it wants its compensation arrangement to spur its agents to obtain fee-
generating new underwritings. On the other hand, such a compensation 
arrangement is likely to undermine the underwriter’s ability to 
ameliorate information asymmetries because the arrangement will 
tempt its agents to please the issuers that they solicit for underwritings 
by forgoing a serious due-diligence investigation and by failing to insist 
that the issuers’ disclosures be consistent with whatever negative 
information is found by the investigation that they do conduct. In other 
words, there is the risk that, in seeking underwritings, these agents will 
free ride on the underwriter’s previously established reputational 
capital. The underwriter’s credibility can, of course, also be enhanced 
by a legal regime that, under specified circumstances, imposes liability 
on it for misstatements.34 
C. Third-Party Certification 
A product certifier that reliably identifies which items are high-
quality versions of the item and credibly communicates what it has 
discovered to the market performs a similar function to that of the 
intermediating merchant. Relative to intermediation, this solution to 
the adverse-selection problem has the advantage of not requiring that 
the skills of quality assessment and those of merchandising be found in 
the same entity. Moreover, compared to the intermediating merchant, 
a certifier has the credibility advantage of not being able to make an 
“end-game” profit by falsely claiming that the product it is selling is 
high quality and receiving a high-quality product price. For securities, 
the certifiers are auditors and, in the case of bonds and securitizations, 
rating agencies. Reputational capital models similar to those 
 
 34. Judge Weinstein, in one of the early seminal cases concerning Securities Act Section 11’s 
imposition on underwriters of strict liability subject to an affirmative due-diligence defense in 
cases involving misstatements in registered offerings, justified requiring underwriters to “assume 
an opposing posture with respect to management” by saying that the “average investor probably 
assumes that some issuers will lie, but he probably has somewhat more confidence in the average 
level of morality of an underwriter who has established a reputation for fair dealing.” Feit v. 
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
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constructed for investment banks have been constructed as well with 
respect to auditors35 and credit-rating agencies.36   
Certifiers are sellers of information and as such face a problem not 
faced by sellers of most products. Any one paying recipient can often 
costlessly reproduce the certifier’s “product” and pass it on to others, 
who then have no need to pay the certifier to get it. Thus, unlike most 
other products, there are no additional sales to help compensate the 
seller for the initial fixed costs of developing the product. Given that 
providing reliable assessments is costly, these incentives problems 
reduce generation of such certifications. 
One work-around to this problem is to have the issuer, rather than 
the potential securities buyer, pay for the certification. This 
arrangement creates its own credibility problems, however. To attract 
more issuers to purchase its services, the certifier too has incentives 
(though, again, perhaps only end-gamed ones) to attract business by 
engaging in a light investigation or failing to pass on or account for 
some negative information that it does find. 
Moreover, it is difficult to design negative legal consequences for 
certifiers that incorrectly identify as high-quality securities ones that 
are really low quality. Unlike an investment bank, the certifier does not 
profit from a successful sale. Unless the certifier takes on the very 
different role of being an insurer of all the possible ways that a security 
could fall short of what was expected, the certifier’s revenues, 
measured on a per-unit-sold basis, will be small. A prospect of high 
liability for an erroneous rating may thus drive all certifiers out of the 
market. Because of this problem, the liability rules applicable to a 
certifier are likely to require a payout of damages only for the most 
egregious errors. Thus the certifier, unlike the merchant, may need to 
rely primarily on reputation, not vulnerability to legal sanction, as its 
source of credibility.  
The failure of certifiers to fully solve the securities-offering 
information-asymmetry problems has a history. The credit-rating 
 
 35. See generally Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, “Low Balling,” and 
Disclosure Regulation, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 113 (1981) (suggesting that “low balling” would not 
impair auditor independence partly because auditors, in deciding whether to cheat, consider loss 
in future audit fees resulting from the loss of reputation).  
 36. See generally L. McDonald Wakeman, The Real Function of Bond Rating Agencies, 1 
CHASE FIN. Q. 18 (1981), reprinted in THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 410 
(Clifford W. Smith, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1990) (suggesting that bond ratings mirrored the market’s 
assessment of a bond’s risk partly because bond-rating agencies depend on their reputation to 
obtain business). 
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scandals in connection with mortgage-backed bonds are still fresh in 
our memories.37 To find other examples, we need look back no further 
than the scandals in the reporting of corporate financials from the early 
2000s to see how problems such as agency problems within the 
certifying organization and oligopoly within the industry reduce the 
effectiveness of this information-asymmetry antidote.38 
D. Buyer Search 
Suppose that, contrary to the initial adverse-selection story told 
above, some or all the buyers can individually ascertain whether the 
particular item that a seller is offering is the high- or low-quality 
version of the product but can do so only at a cost. A buyer who acts in 
this fashion will be willing to pay her reservation price for an item that 
she identifies as high quality, and others can learn something about the 
product’s quality from observing her purchase. Search models in 
information economics can be complex and depend critically on the 
assumptions made, but generally they suggest that a critical factor in 
the success of buyer search in ameliorating adverse-selection problems 
is the cost to the buyer of “visiting” a seller and testing its product.  
The following variation on our ongoing adverse-selection product 
example set out above illustrates the point. Assume that any given 
seller must choose the price at which it offers all its items to the market; 
that is, it engages in a mass offering and cannot price discriminate 
among buyers. Also assume that each seller offering the product at any 
given price will get the same total number of visits by potential buyers. 
A certain percentage of these visitors are testers—persons who, at a 
cost to themselves, can ascertain the quality of what the seller is 
selling—and the remainder are nontesters. The more expensive testing 
is on average, all else equal, the smaller the percentage of the visitors 
that are testers. Relative to the nontesters, testers either put a higher 
value on the difference between the high- and low-quality product or 
can ascertain the difference at less personal cost, perhaps because of 
accumulated skill. Finally, assume that there are economies of scale so 
 
 37. See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The 
Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 109, 120–24 (giving background on the 2008 financial crisis and discussing the role 
of credit agencies in how it unfolded). 
 38. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 108–92 (2006); Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What to Do, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1097–1108 (2008) (book review).  
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that in equilibrium it is not worthwhile for a seller to be in business if 
the seller does not receive a certain minimum number of buy orders.  
Consistent with the original example, a tester is willing to pay one 
hundred dollars for an item that her test reveals is high quality and 
eighty dollars for an item that her test reveals is low quality. A 
nontester is willing to pay a seller the expected value of her purchase. 
If testing were sufficiently expensive that no potential tester would 
engage in testing and every seller were offering the product to the 
market, the potential tester and nontester each would, as in the original 
example, know that 50 percent of the sellers are offering the high-
quality version and 50 percent the low-quality version, but neither set 
of potential buyers could tell at an affordable price which is which. 
Because the high-quality version is worth one hundred dollars to her 
and the low-quality eighty dollars, each buyer would be willing to pay 
ninety dollars. Again, however, this is not an equilibrium solution. 
Assuming that ninety dollars is below the high-quality sellers’ 
reservation prices, there will be no sales by high-quality sellers to 
nontesters. The same result would prevail if the cost of testing were 
somewhat less but sufficiently high that the percentage of visitors that 
would find it worthwhile to test is small. The potential number of 
purchases from high-quality sellers made by testers would be 
sufficiently low that each high-quality seller, for economy-of-scale 
reasons, would find it not worthwhile to sell at all. Under these 
circumstances, the equilibrium solution would again be the same as in 
the original example: no sales of the high-quality version of the 
product.  
Now suppose that testing is inexpensive. Consider the resulting 
change in the nontesters’ expectations in equilibrium. Again, if every 
seller were offering the product, as in the original example, the 
nontester would know that 50 percent of the sellers are offering the 
high-quality version and 50 percent the low-quality version. Again, this 
is not an equilibrium situation. With inexpensive testing, testers will be 
a much larger portion of the visitors to all sellers, including to the high-
quality ones, and these testers will be willing to pay the seller of the 
high-quality product one hundred dollars per unit. Thus high-quality 
sellers may receive enough orders to stay in business at their offer 
price. Moreover, the mere fact that a given seller is selling at a high 
price and is in business filling orders will suggest to the nontester an 
increased possibility that the seller is high quality. Of course, a low-
quality seller could try to masquerade as a high-quality one by offering 
a similarly high price. But if testing is inexpensive, the masquerader too 
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will be visited by many testers, each of whom will be unwilling to buy 
at the high price, and, given the economies of scale, the loss of 
customers would be too costly for the masquerade to be a successful 
strategy. Thus, in equilibrium, nontesters too may think it is likely that 
a high-price seller is also a high-quality seller, so that they too are 
willing to pay the high price. In other words, if buyer search and testing 
are sufficiently inexpensive, they can eliminate the adverse-selection 
problem even though not everyone tests.  
This example illustrates the importance of institutions, whether 
private or public, that reduce the cost of buyer search and testing. 
Standardization of the language of seller disclosure, such as the posting 
of gasoline mileage calculated in a regulated way on all new autos for 
sale, is an example. The value of low-cost search and testing may even 
call for standardization limiting the variation of certain characteristics 
of the product where the variation is of little or no value to buyers and 
makes comparisons more difficult.39  
More generally, the fact that in many situations a buyer can reduce 
information asymmetries by engaging in search and testing suggests 
something about appropriate liability rules. To the extent that such 
actions by buyers are the most cost-effective way for these asymmetries 
to be reduced, sellers and merchants should be given a defense against 
liability actions brought by nontesting buyers based on a claim that the 
seller or merchant failed to disclose the discoverable problem in the 
product’s quality.40  
Applying these models to securities, two particular features of an 
offering improve the chances that buyer search can help resolve its 
adverse-selection problems. One is that the offering must be at the 
same price to all offerees. The other is that some investors each invest 
a substantial amount of money in the offering. The more dollars an 
investor is seeking to invest, the lower the cost of doing the 
investigation per dollar invested. The presence of the large investors 
reassures the smaller ones.41 
 
 39. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Competitive Equilibria in Markets for 
Heterogeneous Goods Under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical Analysis with Policy 
Implications, 13 BELL J. ECON. 181, 181–83 (1982) (proposing policy prescriptions after setting 
out a model somewhat resembling the example in the text). 
 40. This concept is comparable to the analysis in accident law to the role of defenses based 
on the concept of contributory negligence. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW 9–21 (1987). 
 41. Internet-based solicitations of accredited investors based on Securities Act Rule 506(c), 
see infra Part V.B, provide an example. Successful such offerings involve substantial investments 
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III.  AFFIRMATIVE-DISCLOSURE REGIMES  
The story so far can be summarized as follows. When an issuer is 
first contemplating a potential public offering of truly new securities, 
information asymmetries abound. Unless the adverse-selection effects 
from these asymmetries are ameliorated in some fashion, the resulting 
discount in price that investors are willing to pay may well make the 
offering not worth making. This represents an economic loss to society 
if the offering is one that would have proceeded in a world where there 
were no such asymmetries. There are several market-based antidotes 
that help ameliorate these adverse-selection effects: signaling, 
investment bank intermediation, certifiers, and buyer search. These 
antidotes are not, either individually or in combination, fully effective 
cures to the problem, however. Thus, if we rely on just these solutions, 
many worthwhile real investment projects will still not be funded.  
This shortfall in adverse-selection amelioration raises the issue as 
to whether there is a role for government-based regulation to 
supplement what parties can accomplish just using contract and tort 
law. Specifically, three questions need to be answered. First, would it 
be useful to have a government-designed affirmative-disclosure 
regime, whereby an issuer making an offering that is subject to the 
regime is required to answer certain questions? Second, if it would be 
worthwhile to have such a regime, at least for offerings with particular 
characteristics, should the regime be imposed on all issuers making 
such offerings or only on those that volunteer to be subjected to it? 
Finally, when an issuer or other person associated with an offering 
makes a material misstatement in connection with the offering or fails 
to properly answer a question imposed by the disclosure regime, should 
regulation create for investors one or more causes of action for 
damages that go beyond what is available to the investors under tort 
law and under the terms of the contracts they enter into with regard to 
the offering? The first two of these questions are the topic of this Part, 
and the final question is the topic of Part IV.  
 
by well-known angel investors or venture capital firms, and the other investors rely on the 
expertise of these substantial investors. Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for 
Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 565 (2015). 
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A. The Rationale for an Affirmative-Disclosure Regime at the Time 
of the Offering 
The signaling model has two key points of failure when applied to 
the real world. One is that not all statements that issuers make are fully 
credible. The solution to this is straightforward: increase the negative 
consequences that result from making false statements. The other is 
that investors are unable to interpret the silence of issuers in a way that 
permits investors to infer with full accuracy the true situation 
concerning what has not been said. The solution to this second point of 
failure is an affirmative-disclosure regime. When an issuer is making a 
public offering that is subject to an affirmative-disclosure regime, it 
must answer certain questions. Requiring an issuer to answer a 
question clears up whatever ambiguity would otherwise have arisen if 
the issuer had remained silent concerning the matter, at least assuming 
the answer is credible.  
The basic mechanism of the signaling model is that one can infer 
that a bad state of affairs exists from an issuer’s silence about a 
particular matter. This is because, according to the model, if the 
situation were better, the issuer would say so. Consider, from the 
discussion above, some of the reasons why, in the real world, silence 
may be ambiguous concerning the actual state of affairs. One reason is 
that a bad state of affairs in fact does not exist but the issuer finds that 
disclosing the actual good state of affairs is costlier to it than whatever 
it would gain in terms of a better price for its securities. As noted above, 
this could be the case, for example, where disclosure of the information 
would disadvantage the issuer with regard to the terms it can negotiate 
with its major suppliers and customers or in terms of its competition 
with other firms. Another reason that silence may be ambiguous is that 
a low-quality issuer’s silence may only reveal that it is inferior to other 
issuers, not how inferior it is. Subjecting the issuer to an affirmative-
disclosure regime that includes a question about the matter resolves 
ambiguity arising for any of these reasons because the issuer needs to 
disclose what the actual state of affairs is.  
Moreover, in contrast to the simple signaling models in the 
economics literature involving just a single feature of a product, issuers 
in the real world possess, or are in a good position through 
investigation to discover, a large range of different kinds of information 
that can help predict their future cash flows and hence affect the 
desirability of their shares. For many of these kinds of information, 
most investors will not have the ability to make very accurate negative 
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inferences from silence on any given subject. One reason is that they 
may lack the necessary sophistication. Another reason may be 
bounded rationality. Each of the thousands of issuers in the market 
either says something, or remains silent, about each of a myriad of 
different matters that might affect its future cash flows. Investors 
rationally may be unable to cost-effectively process all the data that 
would be needed to make distinctions among all these issuers based on 
whether they were silent or said something.42 Finally, investors may be 
unable to make the correct inferences from silence because they have 
a behavioral tendency not to recognize negative implications of silence 
with respect to some of these kinds of information.43 An affirmative-
disclosure regime can help correct investors’ inability to make 
appropriate negative inferences from silence that arises from any of 
these problems. A negative disclosure with respect to a given matter 
stands out more than silence with respect to the matter, thereby 
making the information more salient.  
A rule mandating disclosure of any given kind of information can 
also reduce the cost of making distinctions among issuers with respect 
to the matter involved by regularizing the language used by all issuers 
discussing the matter. Such a rule will thus help an individual investor, 
or her advisor, identify more easily which offerings are low quality. It 
will also enhance the functioning of one of the other market-based 
antidotes to adverse selection: buyer search. By lowering the cost for 
potential buyers who do search and test, those investors who do not 
search and test are better able to rely, as signals of quality, on the price 
established by the actions of investors who do. 
B. The Rationale for a Periodic-Disclosure Regime After the Time of 
the Offering 
Potential investors in an offering by an issuer of truly new 
securities are likely to have little knowledge of the capabilities of the 
issuer’s managers and their willingness to work hard. Nor will they 
have much knowledge of the inclination, if any, of these managers, and 
 
 42. Russell Korobkin makes a similar point with respect to the limited capacity of market 
forces to police the fine-print terms in consumer contracts because, due to bounded rationality, 
consumers cannot absorb, analyze, and act on this information. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206–07 
(2003). 
 43. Id. at 1247–54. This is an application of the more general principle in behavioral 
economics of the “what you see is all you get” phenomenon. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
FOX IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  3:27 PM 
698  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:673 
of any control shareholders still remaining after the offering, to divert 
issuer cash flows to themselves. Disclosure at the time of the offering 
can only do so much to reduce the asymmetry between what investors 
know and what these insiders know about their own capabilities and 
inclinations. The more effective the ongoing constraints are on 
managers and control shareholders to act in a way that maximizes the 
value of the shares held by outsiders, the less this asymmetry between 
the insiders and investors matters. This is because the managers and 
any remaining control shareholders may, undisclosed, have less-than-
pure motives or poor managerial capabilities, but this fact is less 
important for the value of the shares going forward if those insiders are 
more constrained. The less important the asymmetry, the fewer stock 
sales are blocked that would have occurred absent the asymmetry. 
The prospect that an issuer will be subject to an effective ongoing 
mandatory issuer-disclosure regime—a regime that requires an issuer 
to regularly update its disclosures—can reinforce the constraints that 
corporate law and reputational concerns put on diversions. More 
generally, there is a general recognition that transparency is necessary 
for good corporate governance.44 Such disclosure can reveal failures by 
an issuer to follow the procedures, such as an informed independent 
director or shareholder vote, for approving transactions in which the 
managers or control shareholders have an interest.45 More disclosure, 
by making prices more accurate, also makes share-price-based 
compensation a more effective device to incentivize managers to act in 
a share-value-maximizing way. More ongoing disclosure has an 
additional function if the initial public offering (IPO) results in a 
sufficient dispersion of share ownership that no control shareholder 
remains. Without a control shareholder, there is no one to discipline 
the firm’s managers if they are lazy, incompetent, or divert funds to 
themselves. Substitute discipline, however, comes from the threat of 
hostile takeover or pressure by activist hedge funds. More disclosure 
makes these disciplinary mechanisms more effective by making 
 
 44. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 29–32 (2004) (proposing that “corporate governance framework should promote 
transparent and efficient markets” to effect positive economic performance); Mark J. Roe, 
Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 244, 263–69 (2002) (arguing that corporate 
transparency facilitates the separation of ownership from control). 
 45. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL 
STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 31–32, 104 (2016) (explaining the 
importance of SEC mandatory-disclosure rules for reducing such self-interested behavior by 
managers and control shareholders); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions 
of Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 808 (2001) (same). 
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management shortcomings more evident to the market and by 
reducing the risk associated with purchasing a substantial block of 
shares. The existence of more effective disciplinary devices incentivizes 
managers not to misbehave in the first place, and facilitates managerial 
replacement when it nevertheless does occur.46  
C. Mandatory Versus Optional Initial Offering and Ongoing-
Disclosure Regimes 
For the issuers adopting it, a system that makes available for 
voluntary adoption a regime asking certain questions will be just as 
effective at resolving the signaling model’s ambiguity of silence as an 
identical disclosure regime system that is mandatorily imposed on all 
issuers. Moreover, if issuers have a choice of multiple regimes, a 
voluntary system could have the advantage of promoting regulatory 
competition. With such competition, regulators might be spurred to 
find the set of questions that most effectively reduces adverse selection 
while imposing on the issuers the least costs in terms of providing the 
disclosure.47 Alternatively, the different competing regimes might 
provide issuers with a menu of choices where one regime would be 
most effective for one type of issuer and another regime more effective 
for another type of issuer.48 Indeed, the disclosure regime need not 
even be governmentally based, as proposals to use stock exchanges 
instead illustrate.49 A governmentally run regime will have advantages, 
however, in terms of the powers of investigation of any centralized 
enforcer and the capacity to impose strict sanctions for violations.  
Still, a voluntary system is likely, from a social-welfare point of 
view, to be undersubscribed and require less than the optimal level of 
disclosure. For reasons discussed below, an issuer will decide whether 
to sign onto such a regime based on its calculations of the private costs 
and private benefits that will arise from the disclosure that the regime 
 
 46. All of these points are worked out in more detail in Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 
258–59. 
 47. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2365–72 (1998).  
 48. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 922–24 (1998); Stephen J. 
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 231–32 (1996). 
 49. See generally A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions 
with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999) (proposing an exchange-
administered enforcement regime for fraud-on-the-market claims). 
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requires. However, its private costs are likely to be higher than the 
social costs of this disclosure and its private benefits are likely to be less 
than the social benefits. In addition, if not all issuers in a market are 
subject to a disclosure regime, there will not be as much reduction in 
the cost of making distinctions among issuers. Thus the costs of 
individual investor decisionmaking are reduced less and the adverse-
selection-ameliorating benefits of buyer search and testing will not be 
as great. When issuers can choose from among multiple disclosure 
regimes, similar problems arise.50 
1. Private Costs of Issuer Disclosure Exceed Social Costs.  For each 
individual issuer, a disclosure involves two different kinds of costs: 
“operational” costs and “interfirm” costs. Operational costs are the 
out-of-pocket expenses and the diversions of management and staff 
time that issuers incur to provide the information. Interfirm costs arise 
from the fact that the information provided can put the issuer at a 
disadvantage relative to its competitors, major suppliers, and major 
customers.  
Operational costs are costs both to the individual firm and to 
society as a whole. Interfirm costs are costs only to the individual firm. 
They are not social costs because of an externality: the disadvantages 
to the issuer from the disclosure are counterbalanced by the 
advantages it confers on the other firms. Thus, at all levels of 
disclosure, an issuer’s private marginal cost of disclosure will exceed 
the marginal social cost by an amount equal to these interfirm costs 
associated with any particular disclosure level.  
2. Social Benefits of Issuer Disclosure Exceed Private Benefits.  
Information disclosed by one issuer does not just reduce information 
asymmetries with respect to its own offering. The information can be 
useful as well in analyzing other issuers and thus reducing the 
consequences of information asymmetries for the offerings of the other 
issuers. It can also improve the liquidity of secondary trading in 
securities of other issuers by reducing information asymmetries among 
the traders in that market. In addition, by making share prices of these 
other issuers more accurate and making the environment in which they 
are operating as firms more transparent, it can make more effective the 
 
 50. See generally Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer 
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (discussing benefits and costs 
of mandatory regulation of disclosures, nonregulation, and issuer choice regimes). 
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constraints on their managers to operate their firms in a share-value-
maximizing way in the same way that their own firm’s disclosures do.51 
One issuer’s disclosures could, for example, reveal something about 
possible trends for the industry as a whole and thus help clarify the 
extent to which the performance of each of the issuer’s competitors was 
due to its managers’ efforts versus the state of the larger market.52 The 
disclosing issuer’s share price can only capture the resulting reduction 
in the adverse-selection-induced discount and expectations of its 
improved liquidity and share-value-maximizing managerial behavior. 
It cannot capture the similar reductions in the adverse-selection-
induced discount enjoyed by other issuers resulting from the first 
issuer’s disclosures, nor the improvements in the secondary-market 
liquidity of the securities of these other issuers or in their corporate 
governance. Therefore, the private benefit to the disclosing issuer will 
be less than the social benefit.  
3. Impact on Issuer Disclosure Behavior.  Because an issuer’s 
disclosure involves both social costs and social benefits, each issuer has 
some socially optimal level of disclosure, where the marginal social cost 
equals the marginal social benefit. Unregulated, however, an issuer will 
choose the level of disclosure where the marginal private cost equals 
the marginal private benefit. Because the issuer’s private costs of 
disclosure exceed the social costs and its private benefits fall short of 
the social benefits, the issuer’s choice will be below the socially optimal 
level of disclosure.53 With a mandatory-disclosure regime that sets the 
required disclosure level at the higher socially optimal level, any one 
issuer must disclose more than is privately optimal, but this issuer will 
benefit from the additional disclosure of all the other issuers in the 
market because they are also being subject to the same mandate.  
 
 51. See supra Part III.B.  
 52. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 28, at 685.  
 53. I have considered in more detail elsewhere the divergence of the private and social costs 
and benefits of issuer disclosure and the consequent tendency of unregulated issuers to disclose 
below their socially optimal level. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing 
Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2532–51 (1997); see also Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1490–91 (1992) (explaining that, if left to states, the laws 
passed would likely produce less disclosure in the United States); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra 
note 28, at 684–85 (discussing voluntary disclosure); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice 
of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 846–74 (1995) (discussing the history of 
disclosure in the United States). 
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This private-versus-social cost consideration is a powerful reason 
for imposing mandatory periodic disclosure on publicly traded 
corporate issuers because of the corporate governance and liquidity 
enhancement benefits to corporate issuers as a group that result from 
the increased overall level of disclosure.54 Derivatively, it argues for 
imposing the same regime on new corporate issuers as they join the 
group of publicly traded issuers at the time of an IPO.55 
IV.  MANDATED LIABILITY TERMS  
Absent a regulatory intervention, the question of liability of 
issuers, issuer directors and officers, underwriters, dealers, and experts 
such as accountants or rating agencies for misstatements and omissions 
of required disclosures will be determined by tort law and the terms of 
the contracts these various parties enter into with regard to the 
offering. These contracts will also determine the standards for 
imposing such liability with regard to questions of fault, due diligence, 
and burdens of evidentiary persuasion. As a general matter, a 
contractual representation is a warranty. When the representation 
turns out to be false, the party who has made it is liable, without any 
need for the claimant to show fault.56 Only the counterparty to whom 
the claim was made can be a claimant, however. As for any other 
actions based on a false statement of one of the offering participants, 
the tort of deceit requires, among other things, that the claimant show 
that the statement was made with scienter and that the claimant relied 
 
 54. I discuss these points in more detail elsewhere. See Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 
253–67.  
 55. In comparing a system where an issuer can choose its disclosure regime with a mandatory 
system, the argument for a mandatory approach is in one respect weaker in the case of a firm just 
going public than in the case of one that is already publicly traded and has a dispersed ownership 
structure. The insiders of a firm that is just going public are selling their shares in the offering 
and/or diluting their continuing share ownership in the company. Thus, if they are allowed to 
choose their disclosure regime, they will have an interest in choosing the regime that yields the 
highest share price. Because they make their decision based on the issuer’s private costs and 
benefits, the required level of disclosure of the regime that they choose will, for the reasons 
discussed in the text, be lower than what is socially optimal. There is, however, at least a floor set 
by the insiders’ desire to maximize share price. The managers of an already public firm, in 
contrast, may well choose a regime that requires even less disclosure than would the regime that 
would yield the highest share price. The less the market knows about what is going on inside the 
firm, the more protection the managers have against hostile takeover and the pressures on 
managers brought by activist hedge funds. The managers may well find that this added protection 
is worth more to them than whatever they are giving up due to a lower share price. 
 56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that 
a contract is voidable if assent was induced by material misrepresentation, even absent fraud).  
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on the statement in deciding to purchase the security.57 The issue 
addressed here is what considerations might justify regulatory 
intervention to alter this basic scheme. 
A. The Rationale for Imposing Liability on Operating Corporate 
Issuers 
The rationales for a mandatory-disclosure regime set out just 
above imply that the regime should call for a higher level of disclosure 
than would occur if the private parties were left to contract disclosure 
terms on their own and to rely on contract and tort law remedies to 
police misrepresentations. These mandatory-disclosure rules will not 
accomplish their purpose if they are not complied with. Issuer liability 
is one way to encourage compliance. Because the parties would not 
agree on their own to terms requiring the higher level of disclosure 
called for by the mandatory regime, they also cannot be expected to 
agree to socially cost-effective terms concerning compliance-inducing 
issuer liability when this level of disclosure is not provided. 
The analysis of issuer liability must be seen in light of the ideal set 
out earlier: assuring, to the extent practicable and cost-effective, that 
all available information is reflected in price. When this happens, 
society’s scarce savings are steered to the proposed real investment 
projects in the economy that available knowledge suggests are the most 
promising.58  
Consider the situation where the total available information 
known by insiders of the firm, including its nonpublic information, 
suggests that its proposed real investment project is not a good use of 
the economy’s scarce savings, given the greater promise of proposed 
projects of other firms. If the information possessed by insiders is 
disclosed, its offering’s prospective market price would be sufficiently 
low that the proceeds would be less than the discounted present value 
of additional payouts that the firm would need to make later due to the 
share dilution (or additional debt service) resulting from the additional 
securities outstanding. Thus, the issuer will not proceed with the 
offering and will not invest in the project. Doing so would reduce the 
value of the firm.59  
 
 57. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN D. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (5th ed. 1984). 
 58. See supra Part I.D. 
 59. For a general discussion of discounted present value and the comparative opportunity 
costs of risky investments, see BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 16, at 16–17. 
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The issuer may be tempted, however, not to disclose whatever is 
negative in the information possessed by the insiders, or even to make 
false positive statements. If it does not disclose the negative 
information or makes false positive statements, it may be able to get a 
high enough price in a securities offering to make the offering and the 
investment in the unpromising project worthwhile. The prospect of 
liability reduces or eliminates this temptation because it would require 
the issuer to return to investors the amount by which the offering price 
was inflated due to the violation of the disclosure rules.60  
B. The Choice of Liability Regime for the Issuer 
The question remains what the nature of this issuer liability 
scheme should be. One possibility is an absolute strict issuer liability 
regime, as is in fact imposed on issuers pursuant to Section 11(a) of the 
Securities Act for disclosure violations in offerings subject to Section 5 
registration. Another is absolute issuer liability with a defense if the 
top officials of the issuer engaged in adequate due diligence. This is 
similar to the liability scheme under Sections 11(a) and 11(b) of the 
Securities Act currently imposed on the officials themselves and on 
underwriters. A third possibility is scienter-based issuer liability, where 
liability is imposed on the issuer only if the plaintiff investor proves 
that the top officials were aware of the information or were highly 
reckless in not knowing of it. This is the liability scheme under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act,61 the only federal-
 
 60. See Forsythe et al., supra note 19, at 482–84 (discussing experimental evidence that an 
absence of sanctions for false claims can lead investors to purchase inferior securities). Section 
11(e) of the Securities Act provides a somewhat different damages formula, in essence giving the 
plaintiff a prima facie case for the difference between the price paid and the price at time of suit. 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012). The defendant has the burden of proving what damages would be under 
the formula suggested in the text. Id. The defendant enjoys a reduction in the prima facie measure 
of damages only to the extent that it can make this showing. Id. 
 61. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206–14 (1976) (declining to extend liability 
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act to include negligent conduct). Although there 
is not complete agreement among the federal circuits as to which individual or individuals within 
a corporation’s organization need to possess knowledge of facts that render the corporation’s 
statement false or misleading for the statement to constitute a Rule 10b-5 violation by the 
corporation, the focus of most courts tends to be on the top officials. The Ninth Circuit, for 
example, affirmed the dismissal of a complaint against an issuer because insufficient evidence was 
alleged that the CEO, who spoke the alleged misstatement, knew the information rendering it 
false. See In re Apple Comput., Inc., 127 F. App’x 296, 303 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A corporation is 
deemed to have the requisite scienter for fraud only if the individual corporate officer making the 
statement has the requisite level of scienter at the time that he or she makes the statement.” (citing 
Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1435–36 (9th Cir. 1995))). Similarly, the Fifth 
Circuit has stated 
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securities-law bases for a damages suit against an issuer when the sale 
of securities by an issuer involving a misstatement is neither registered 
under the Securities Act nor made pursuant to Regulation A+.62  
1. What Constitutes an Omission or a False or Misleading Statement 
of Fact?  The starting point in the analysis of this question is to note 
that, whichever liability scheme is chosen, a necessary condition is the 
existence of a violation of the disclosure regime’s rules by the issuer. 
This requires that material information required to be disclosed was in 
fact not disclosed, or that the issuer made a statement covered by the 
disclosure regime that was materially false or misleading. In other 
words, at the time of the offering, someone in the world must have 
possessed material information that was either omitted contrary to the 
rules or that renders false or misleading some affirmative statement by 
the issuer. Such knowledge, if it is known by someone in the world, 
would normally be possessed by at least some individuals within the 
issuer’s organization. The fact that this information is deemed material 
means, according to the standard definition, that there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in 
deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold the issuer’s shares.63 If the issuer 
has properly functioning channels of internal intelligence, information 
of this importance would likely become available to the top officials of 
the issuer in the ordinary course of day-to-day business. These top 
officials are ultimately responsible for the content of the issuer’s 
disclosures in connection with the offering. For example, under the 
Securities Act registration procedures, these officials are required to 
sign the statement.64  
 
For purposes of determining whether a statement made by the corporation was made 
by it with the requisite Rule 10(b) scienter we believe it appropriate to look to the state 
of mind of the individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the statement 
(or order or approve it or its making or issuance, or who furnish information or 
language for inclusion therein, or the like) rather than generally to the collective 
knowledge of all the corporation’s officers and employees acquired in the course of 
their employment.  
Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 62. See infra Parts V.B–C. 
 63. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 64. Section 11 imposes absolute liability also on these top officials, subject to a due-diligence 
defense. In applying this statutory scheme, however, the courts have acted in a way consistent 
with the view in the text that all material information about the issuer has very likely been made 
available to its top officials. The courts almost conclusively presume that an issuer’s top officials 
know such information despite the theoretical availability of a due-diligence defense. See Feit v. 
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 577–78 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (explaining how 
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2. Comparing Strict Absolute Liability to Scienter-Based Liability.  
Consider first an issuer liability scheme whereby liability is only 
imposed on the issuer if some relevant top official has scienter with 
respect to this information, in essence the Rule 10b-5 damages action 
scheme. This liability scheme has three distinct disadvantages relative 
to absolute strict issuer liability. First, a scienter requirement creates 
incentives to distort the functioning of an issuer’s channels of internal 
intelligence so as to keep its top officials from receiving information 
that indicates that a planned offering’s disclosures violate the 
disclosure rules. The benefit to the issuer is that, with the top officials 
in the dark, the issuer could violate the rules free of any liability and be 
able to keep the gains from the resulting inflated price of its offering. 
Such distorted channels of internal intelligence, however, will 
obviously degrade the issuer’s ability to make efficient operating and 
real investment decisions as a firm. Hence they will damage the overall 
efficiency of the economy.  
Second, to the extent that such distorted channels succeed in 
protecting top officers from information, an offering that might not be 
worthwhile at a price that reflects this information can proceed without 
its disclosure. As a result, the economy’s scarce savings will be 
misallocated to an inferior investment project.  
Third, a liability system for top officials requiring a showing of 
scienter significantly expands the range of facts that will be in 
contention in litigation because it introduces the additional issue of 
who knew what. This increases the amount of society’s scarce resources 
that will be consumed by each side in any case where suit is brought. 
Moreover, with the plaintiff investor facing higher costs if she brings a 
suit, a disclosure violation is less likely to trigger such suit. The 
resulting diminished likelihood that the issuer will have to pay damages 
reduces deterrence.65  
 
insider directors are presumed to have greater knowledge of corporate affairs, making it almost 
impossible for them to establish a due-diligence defense); Ernest L. Folk, III, Civil Liabilities 
Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 22, 30–38 (1969).  
 65. Absolute strict liability, in making suits easier to bring, will also increase the number of 
suits where, despite an issuer having a properly functioning intelligence system, the top 
management in fact did not know the relevant information. In such a situation, the prospect of 
liability would have no influence on behavior and hence no deterrence value. The additional 
social resources expended by the parties in such actions would thus serve no useful social purpose. 
The analysis in the text suggests that such situations will be rare, however, and so the gain from 
increased deterrence is the more important consequence of suits being easier to bring. 
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3. Comparing Strict Absolute Liability to Absolute Liability with a 
Due-Diligence Defense.  Absolute strict issuer liability also has 
advantages relative to a second possible liability standard—strict issuer 
liability with a defense available when the issuer can show that its top 
officials engaged in adequate due diligence66—though the advantages 
are fewer than when the comparison is with scienter-based liability. A 
more detailed analysis of the operation of such a due-diligence defense 
follows in connection with the discussion below of underwriter 
liability.67 A couple of observations with regard to its operation when 
applied to the issuer are appropriate here, however. Unlike scienter-
based issuer liability, allowing the issuer a due-diligence defense would 
not likely create incentives to distort the functioning of an issuer’s 
channels of internal intelligence. This is because credible evidence that 
a firm distorted its channels of communication to keep its top officials 
in the dark would prevent the firm from being able to maintain the due-
diligence defense and thus the firm would be absolutely liable anyway. 
On the other hand, allowing the defense would still enlarge the range 
of facts that will be in contention in litigation, thereby increasing the 
social resources that will be expended by each side in any case where 
suit is brought and reducing deterrence by making suits costlier for 
plaintiff investors to bring. Relative to requiring plaintiffs to show 
scienter, however, these effects would be modest because the defense 
would be difficult to maintain given the likelihood that the top officers 
would find out the information in the ordinary course of business.  
C. The Rationale for Underwriter Liability 
Even if an issuer is subject to absolute strict liability and it is 
costless for a plaintiff investor to bring a suit for damages on any 
occasion where an issuer engaging in a securities offering violates the 
mandatory-disclosure rules, deterrence would not be fully effective. 
One reason is that the undisclosed information that makes the offering 
statement disclosures in violation of the rules often relates to the 
possibility of an event that ultimately bankrupts the issuer, particularly 
an issuer publicly offering truly new securities. Bankruptcy can render 
the issuer partially or totally judgment-proof. Another is that the 
 
 66. Absolute liability subject to a due-diligence defense is in fact essentially the liability 
scheme for issuers in connection with Regulation A+ offerings pursuant to Securities Act Section 
3(b)(2)(D), which, in turn, imposes the liability scheme set out under Section 12(a)(2). See 15 
U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(D) (2012). 
 67. See infra Part IV.D. 
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issuer’s agents, including its top officials, may engage in a kind of 
“emphasis on the positive” or “keep the boss happy” groupthink. As a 
result, even where relevant information is available to the top 
managers, it is downplayed. Hence the top managers become blinded 
to its importance and thus to the liability that would flow from its 
nondisclosure.  
The rationale for adding underwriter liability to the scheme starts 
with the fact again that a disclosure violation can allow a public offering 
to proceed that otherwise would not, with the resulting misallocation 
of society’s scarce savings.68 As developed below, underwriter liability 
can help make up for these two sources of shortfall in the ability of 
issuer liability to deter such violations. In the stages leading up to a 
public offering, the underwriter is in a much better position to discover 
information related to potential disclosure violations by an issuer than 
are the prospective investors. The prospect that the underwriter will 
face liability for investor losses if it is aware of such undisclosed 
information will likely lead the underwriter to force the issuer to 
disclose it. If the issuer does not comply, the underwriter is likely to 
refuse to proceed with the offering. The expected cost of participating 
in the offering without the disclosure is just too high. Just as with issuer 
liability, the conclusion that the parties would not, on their own, 
negotiate the socially justified higher level of disclosure called for by 
the mandatory rules also implies that they cannot be counted on to 
negotiate socially cost-effective terms with regard to compliance-
inducing underwriter liability.69  
1. Issuer Bankruptcy.  Assume, as happens not infrequently, that 
information exists suggesting the possibility of an event that, if it 
occurs, will bankrupt the issuer. Assume also that the increased 
likelihood of bankruptcy suggested by the information is sufficiently 
great that the information would be considered material and its 
nondisclosure would violate the disclosure regime’s rules. Not 
disclosing the information would inflate the price at which the 
securities could be sold. Both the issuer’s top management and the 
underwriter know the information, and each will act rationally in the 
face of whatever liability regime it faces.  
With these assumptions in mind, consider a regime where the 
underwriter is potentially liable as well as the issuer. Relative to the 
 
 68. See supra Part I.D. 
 69. See supra Part IV.A. 
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issuer, the underwriter has less to gain, and, if liable, more to lose on 
an expected basis, from the nondisclosure of this information. In terms 
of gain, the underwriter’s percentage commission is just a small fraction 
of the sales price of the offering and thus it gets only a small fraction of 
the violation’s inflation in price; all the rest of the sales-price inflation 
goes to the issuer.70 In terms of loss, at the time that the issuer officials 
are deciding whether to make the offering without disclosing the 
information, they know that if the event ultimately does not occur, the 
issuer will enjoy the upside of a more favorable price. If the event 
ultimately does occur, the issuer will be judgment-proof and thus will 
not be able to pay investors the damages assessed against it in litigation.  
On an expected basis, the issuer may thus rationally find it 
worthwhile to make the offering without disclosing the information. 
The calculation of the underwriter is much different. Its upside, if the 
event does not occur, is only the small fraction of the inflation in the 
offering price. If the event does occur and the issuer becomes 
judgment-proof, the underwriter will be liable for the full amount. The 
underwriter is much more likely to be good for the judgment and thus 
required to pay. This is because the underwriter is likely to start off 
well capitalized and subject to a more diversified set of risks. So, its net 
worth usually will be at most only mildly affected by the event that 
bankrupted the issuer. In sum, even based just on the calculations 
considered so far and assuming that the underwriter does in fact know 
the information, making the underwriter liable in addition to the issuer 
can significantly add to the likelihood that the information will be 
disclosed.  
2. Issuer Irrationality.  Now consider an additional source of issuer-
liability-deterrence shortfall: the possibility that the issuer’s top 
officials, despite having the relevant information available to them, do 
not rationally perceive the violations imbedded in their planned 
disclosures and the future liabilities that these violations would 
engender. As a consequence, with only issuer liability, these officials 
might proceed with the offering without disclosure even though this is 
not the rational share-value-maximizing decision. Agents of the 
underwriter are from an organization separate from that of the issuer. 
 
 70. This is so even if compliance with the disclosure rules would make the offered securities 
look sufficiently less attractive that the offering would not proceed at all, in which case the 
underwriter would lose the small fraction of what the total offering amount would be sold for with 
the breach, whereas the issuer would lose the whole rest of the value of the deal to it. 
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This is important from a behavioral and group-dynamics point of view 
because persons who are members of a single organization, including 
those near or at the top, are prone to engage in “emphasis on the 
positive” or “keep the boss happy” groupthink.71 This is a danger when 
an issuer is going through the group decision process of deciding the 
disclosures to provide in connection with a securities offering. The 
underwriter’s agents are outside the issuer organization and are less 
likely to be trapped by this tendency. Thus they are better able to 
appreciate the liability implications of available information. Also, the 
process of generating a registration statement involves dialogue among 
many different people from the underwriter’s and issuer’s 
organizations. Agents of the underwriter, because they are not part of 
the issuer’s hierarchy, will feel freer to pose hard questions to the 
issuer’s top officials than do more junior individuals within the issuer’s 
own organization.72  
D. The Choice of Liability Regime for Underwriters 
Again there is the question of what the nature of this underwriter 
liability scheme should be: scienter-based liability, strict absolute 
liability, or absolute liability with a due-diligence defense.  
1. Scienter-Based Liability Versus Strict Liability With or Without 
a Due-Diligence Defense.  As with issuer liability, scienter-based 
underwriter liability has distinct disadvantages relative to the other two 
possible regimes. First, scienter-based underwriter liability less 
effectively counteracts the shortfalls in the deterrence value of issuer 
liability. This is because, under such a scheme, the underwriter is less 
likely to face liability in situations where issuer-liability deterrence has 
failed. If a plaintiff investor does bring suit, the underwriter will escape 
liability unless the plaintiff can affirmatively prove that the underwriter 
 
 71. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF 
FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 197–98 (1972). Donald Langevoort, in his recent 
book, emphasizes the capacity of a firm to irrationally underestimate the negative future 
consequences of disclosure violations because of the tendency of people to engage in self-
deception in situations of ambiguity, the tendency for overconfident people to make it to top 
managerial positions, and pressures at all levels to accentuate the positives that inevitably arise 
from the development of team cohesion. LANGEVOORT, supra note 44, at 28, 36, 40–41.  
 72. See id. at 88. The view that the underwriter can enhance compliance with the disclosure 
rules by playing a somewhat adverse, devil’s advocate role vis-à-vis the issuer has deep roots in 
the jurisprudence of liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act. See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data 
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581–82 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. 
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  
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was aware of the information the nondisclosure of which renders the 
issuer’s offering materials in violation of the rules. Even if the 
underwriter did know the information, the plaintiff may not be able to 
prove this fact because of difficulties in obtaining the relevant 
evidence. Moreover, because the requirement adds to the cost of the 
plaintiff investor bringing suit, fewer suits will be brought. Second, 
under a scienter-based underwriter liability regime, an underwriter will 
not face liability if it in fact had not learned the information.  
Beyond this, and most seriously, a scienter-based regime actually 
creates a disincentive for the underwriter to engage in due diligence in 
which, because of a concern with its reputation, it would otherwise 
have engaged. This is because in a scienter-based liability system, the 
underwriter cannot be liable for what it does not find out.   
2. Strict Liability With or Without a Due-Diligence Defense.  The 
foregoing discussion suggests that strict underwriter liability with or 
without a due-diligence defense is preferable to scienter-based 
underwriter liability. But which form of strict liability is preferable?  
a. Assuming a Costless, Error-Free Determination of the Due-
Diligence Defense.  If the underwriter is strictly liable and is allowed no 
due-diligence defense, rationally it will perform due diligence up to the 
point at which, at the margin, the cost of expending additional effort is 
greater than the resulting decrease in expected damages as the result 
of an investor suit. As we have seen, the measure of these damages is, 
roughly, the inflation in the offering’s price as a result of the offering 
document’s misstatement or omission.73 In other words, the 
underwriter will keep looking for possible problems until the point 
where the cost of further search is greater than its assessment of (x) the 
probability, based on what it has found so far, of finding additional, as 
yet undetected, problems, multiplied by (y) the amount by which the 
disclosure violations associated with these additional possible 
problems would inflate the price of the offering. The underwriter 
would be faced with what information economists refer to as an 
optimal-stopping problem.74 
 
 73. See supra Part IV.B. 
 74. The optimal stopping problem concerns when it is the optimal time to take a certain 
action, in this case to stop looking for possible problems. For an application of optimal stopping 
in a somewhat different legal context, see Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, 
and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 697–
700 (1985). 
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What would be the effect of providing such an underwriter with a 
defense if it can show that it engaged in a reasonable due-diligence 
effort? This is the regime under the Securities Act for registered public 
offerings, where Section 11(a) imposes absolute liability on the 
underwriter and Section 11(b) modifies this by allowing the 
underwriter the affirmative defense that it engaged in a reasonable 
investigation and reasonably believed there was no disclosure 
violation.  
The first point to note is that a rational underwriter will expend 
the same level of effort with or without the defense if the determination 
of whether the defense was met could be made through costless and 
perfectly accurate adjudication. To see this, first consider the position 
of an underwriter where the defense is available. Because the standard 
for the investigation is reasonableness, the underwriter is entitled to be 
free of liability if it expends effort in due diligence at least up to the 
point that, at the margin, additional effort will cost the underwriter 
more than the expected improvement in the wealth position of 
investors through the disclosure of additional problems that would 
inflate the price that investors need to pay if not disclosed.75 It would 
be irrational for an underwriter to expend less effort than what meets 
the reasonableness standard. If it does expend less effort, the defense 
will not be available and so it will be absolutely liable and face expected 
costs of liability—damages equal to the amount by which the 
nondisclosure of the undetected problem inflates price—that are 
greater than the costs of the additional effort that would detect the 
problem. On the other side, it would also be irrational for the 
underwriter to expend, at least for fear-of-liability reasons, more effort 
than what meets the reasonableness standard because doing so is not 
necessary to avoid liability.  
 
 75. Section 11(c) of the Securities Act, for example, provides that “the standard of 
reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property.” 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (2012). This implies some kind of cost-benefit analysis: a prudent man would 
not, at the margin, spend more on investigation than the expected value of the poor returns that 
would be avoided by not purchasing assets the inferiority of which would only be revealed by 
more intense investigation. This point is affirmed by the holding in In re Software Toolworks, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1489, 1496–1500 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 38 F.3d 1078 
(9th Cir. 1994), amended by 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1995), which granted summary judgment to 
underwriters with respect to certain misstatements, the falsity of which could have been 
ascertained with more intensive due diligence, but where the court found no issue of fact that the 
underwriter did not make reasonable efforts. Similarly, the court in BarChris stated in dicta that 
accountants need not be held to a standard higher than that of their profession. BarChris, 283 F. 
Supp. at 703. 
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Now consider the position of the underwriter if the defense were 
not available. It would again be irrational to do less than the standard 
for exactly the same reason: it will be absolutely liable and the costs of 
a more thorough investigation are less than the amount of expected 
liability that the more thorough investigation would avoid. And it 
would be irrational to do more than the standard because, although the 
underwriter now will be liable for undetected problems even if its 
investigation meets the reasonableness standard, the expected costs of 
liability from these more hidden problems are less than the costs of the 
additional effort needed to detect them. 
In sum, under the assumption that the determination of the due-
diligence defense is costless and error-free, the underwriter will expend 
the same level of effort in due diligence with or without a due-diligence 
defense. Thus, in the choice as to whether or not to permit underwriters 
a due-diligence defense, the fear that, absent the defense, underwriters 
will expend too much effort searching for problems that are too 
insignificant or too unlikely to be worth the trouble would not be a 
good reason for providing the defense.76  
b. Taking Account of the Cost of Determining the Due-Diligence 
Defense and the Chance of Judicial Error.  A significant consideration 
against providing the due-diligence defense to underwriters relates to 
the real-world facts that there are costs that come from enlarging the 
range of facts that will be in contention in litigation and that there is a 
possibility of judicial error in their determination. Again, enlarging the 
range of facts in contention means that each side will consume more of 
society’s scarce resources in battle. Also, because a plaintiff investor’s 
cost of bringing suit is higher, the underwriter is less likely to face suit 
even when it did fail to perform a reasonable investigation. With the 
resulting reduction in the underwriter’s expected damages payments if 
it fails to perform a reasonable investigation, the underwriter will not 
have as strong incentives to act in the ways that counteract the 
shortfalls in the deterrence value of issuer liability.  
The possibility of legal error further weakens these incentives. The 
underwriter, when deciding how much due-diligence effort to make, 
knows that a court may find that its investigation was sufficient to meet 
 
 76. The foregoing discussion shows that the underwriter will engage in the optimal amount 
of search with absolute strict liability. It will engage in the same amount of diligence under a strict-
liability regime with a due-diligence defense if the determination of whether the defense is met 
can be costlessly adjudicated free of error. If this determination is not costless or error-free, the 
availability of the defense will, as discussed below, reduce the amount of diligence. 
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the defense when in fact it was not. If this happens, the underwriter will 
not have to pay damages. Relative to a strict absolute liability regime, 
the possibility of this error reduces the expected cost of failing to 
conduct an adequate investigation. Thus, it reduces the incentives to 
conduct such an investigation. Of course, the court also might err in the 
other way and find that the investigation was not sufficient when in fact 
it was. That possibility, however, simply puts the issuer in the same 
position as if it did not have the defense.  
c. Absolute Strict Liability Ties a Due-Diligence and an Insurance 
Function.  There is also a significant consideration in favor of providing 
the due-diligence defense, however. Without the defense, some firms 
will be inefficiently discouraged from being in the underwriting 
business because providing underwriting services would require tying 
together two rather different businesses. One is the investigation of 
issuers and merchandising of securities—traditional functions of 
investment banks. The other business is insuring investors against risks 
that exist but are not worth searching out to eliminate—what we might 
call the “pure insurance” business. Even though, in a competitive 
equilibrium, any potential underwriter would be able to pass on to 
investors the expected payouts for this pure insurance, some such 
potential underwriters, although well suited to provide investigation 
and merchandising services, are not well suited to perform the pure 
insurance business. Being well suited to provide the pure insurance 
business would require quite different firm qualities: some 
combination of substantial capital on hand to cover years where actual 
aggregate payouts exceed the level of expected payouts and a large 
scale of operations in terms of the number of offerings underwritten so 
that, through the law of large numbers, its actual aggregate annual 
payouts would be very unlikely to deviate sharply from the expected 
level of payouts. 
d. Conclusion.  It is hard to know for certain whether, for offerings 
by ordinary operating corporate issuers, the favorable or the 
unfavorable considerations with respect to the defense predominate. It 
should be noted, however, that the concerns about costs and legal error 
associated with providing the defense are softened by the nature of the 
facts in contention. The primary issue before a court will not be 
whether the underwriter knew the information that rendered the 
issuer’s offering disclosures in violation of the rules but what the 
underwriter did to conduct its investigation. Such conduct is relatively 
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easily ascertainable and objectively measurable, which reduces both 
the cost of having them in contention and the likelihood of judicial 
error.  
V.  REFORMS AIMED AT SMALLER CORPORATE ISSUERS 
Parts I–IV of this Article go back to first principles to answer a 
number of questions. First, should the government provide a system of 
disclosure regulation at the time of the offering of truly new securities 
and thereafter, and if so, under what circumstances? Second, if there is 
such a regulatory regime, should it be mandatory or should an issuer 
be able to choose whether to be subject to it? Third, which participants 
in the offering, if any, should be held civilly liable for damages if, at the 
time of the offering, there were misstatements or omissions of required 
disclosures? Fourth, for any participant that is liable, what should the 
standard be? This final Part applies what has been learned to evaluate 
the contemporary legal treatment of public offerings of truly new 
securities in the United States. 
Traditionally, essentially all offerings of truly new securities that 
would be considered “public” as the term is used here77 were subject to 
the disclosure-oriented registration process under Section 5 of the 
Securities Act. Exemptions from this registration process were 
available for certain offerings based on such factors as the limited 
number of offerees; the sophistication, wealth, and prior knowledge 
about the issuer held by the offerees; and the amount being raised. But 
in general the exempted offerings would not be considered public in 
this sense.  
Compliance with this regulatory scheme is expensive and involves 
fixed-cost elements that mean that there are considerable economies 
of scale in terms of offering size. Typically, the smaller the firm, the 
smaller the scale of the proposed project that it seeks to fund. So, when 
a smaller firm contemplates a public offering of truly new securities to 
fund such a project, the size of the offering that it can plausibly justify 
is likely to be smaller. The smaller the size of the offering, the greater 
the cost per dollar raised for compliance with the traditional regulatory 
structure. In sum, the smaller the size of the firm, the less likely it is 
that a public offering of truly new securities will be an economically 
sensible way of raising capital. Concern that most firms below a certain 
size cannot practically use a public offering of truly new securities as a 
 
 77. See supra Introduction. 
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means of raising capital has led in recent years to the development of 
alternative, more lenient regimes for certain kinds of public offerings, 
culminating with Rule 506(c) and Regulation A+ and the 
crowdfunding rules.  
As will be developed below, aspects of these reforms seem ill-
advised. The main features of the Section 5 registration process adhere 
closely to what is called for by the first-principles analysis in Parts I–
IV, whereas certain important features of these alternative regimes do 
not.  
A. The Section 5 Registration Process 
The traditional Section 5 registration process, combined with its 
civil-liability provisions under Section 11, has four core components. 
First, rather than relying on signaling backed by scienter-based liability 
for material misstatements, the regime requires issuers to affirmatively 
answer a set of questions. Second, this regime is mandatorily applied 
to all securities offerings not explicitly exempted. Third, the issuer, by 
conducting a registered IPO, automatically becomes subject to the 
Exchange Act’s mandatory ongoing periodic-disclosure regime as well. 
Fourth, in the event that the registration statement contains a 
disclosure violation,78 the issuer is faced with strict absolute liability, 
and the underwriter is faced with absolute liability subject to an 
affirmative due-diligence defense.79 These core elements thus largely 
correspond with what the analysis in Parts I–IV suggest would be 
optimal.   
B. Rule 506(c) Offerings  
Rule 506(c),80 promulgated by the SEC in 201381 pursuant to a 
mandate under the JOBS Act enacted in 2012,82 allows any issuer to 
 
 78. Securities Act Section 11(a) provides, without qualification, that each person signing the 
registration statement is liable if it contains a material misstatement or omission. The issuer is one 
of the required signatories. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).  
 79. Securities Act Section 11(a) provides, without qualification, that an offering’s 
underwriters are liable if the registration statement contains a material misstatement or omission, 
but Section 11(b) provides that notwithstanding 11(a), an underwriter will not be liable if it can 
sustain a due-diligence defense. Id. § 77k(b). 
 80. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015). 
 81. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 24, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
230, 239, 242). 
 82. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a), 126 Stat. 
206, 315 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d). 
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make a public offering of truly new securities without going through 
the traditional Securities Act registration process. Most commentators 
have not fully grasped how potentially revolutionary this exemption is. 
1. Required Structure of the Offering.  The exemption from 
registration has remarkably few restrictions and a Rule 506(c) offering 
is less burdened by regulation than a traditional one in a number of 
ways. The issuer may engage in a general solicitation to raise an 
unlimited amount of money from an unlimited number of investors as 
long as it takes reasonable steps to verify that each actual purchaser is 
an “accredited investor.” In general, an individual qualifies as an 
accredited investor if she has an income of at least $200,000 or net 
assets (not including her primary residence) of at least $1 million.83 
Because most of the individually held stock in the country is held by 
such persons, this restriction does not cut out a substantial amount of 
potential demand that would have been present with a registered 
offering.84 Rule 506(c) has no affirmative disclosure obligations 
associated with it, and an offering under the rule does not trigger an 
obligation to provide ongoing periodic disclosure. The issuer is subject 
only to scienter-based liability under Rule 10b-5 for any material 
misstatements it makes in connection with the offering. Because the 
exemption is only available to issuers,85 the offering cannot be made 
pursuant to a firm-commitment underwriting, whereby an investment 
bank buys the securities from the issuer and resells them in the offering 
to the public. The absence of a restriction on general solicitation 
means, however, that a broker can be used to solicit purchasers. The 
broker would also be subject only to scienter-based Rule 10b-5 liability 
and only for any material misstatement that the broker itself makes.  
2. Subsequent Trading of Shares.  The only way that a Rule 506(c) 
offering is more burdened by regulation than a traditional registered 
offering is that the offered securities are “restricted.” This means that 
purchasers in the offering can only resell their shares pursuant to 
Securities Act registration or an exemption therefrom.86 Here too, 
 
 83. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).  
 84. See Fatih Guvenen, Do Stockholders Share Risk More Effectively than Nonstockholders?, 
89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 275, 281 (2007). 
 85. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
 86. For a discussion of rules and statutory provisions that lead to this result, see Bradley 
Berman & Steven Bleiberg, Restricted Securities vs. Control Securities: What Are the Differences?, 
INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Dec. 2013, at 1–7. 
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however, recent reforms take much of the sting out of this disadvantage 
and offer the prospect that the securities will be relatively freely 
tradable soon after the offering.  
a. Rule 144.  One route to relatively free secondary-market trading 
is via Rule 144,87 which in recent years has been subject to easing 
amendments several times. As a result, restricted shares of an issuer 
not providing Exchange Act periodic disclosures become unrestricted 
after being held for a period of only one year in the hands of one or 
more investors unaffiliated with the issuer.88 As unrestricted shares, 
they can be traded freely between any two persons. Liquidity will be 
maximized if the issuer chooses to list its stock on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ, but doing so will, under Sections 12 
and 13 of the Exchange Act, trigger imposition of the Act’s ongoing 
periodic-disclosure requirements that is otherwise avoided by doing a 
Rule 506(c) offering rather than the traditional registered offering.   
Alternatively, the stock could start trading on an electronic 
trading venue that is not registered as an exchange under the Exchange 
Act, such as OTCQX or OTCB. Unlike the NYSE or NASDAQ, 
trading on this kind of venue would not by itself trigger imposition of 
the Exchange Act’s periodic-disclosure requirements. The other 
periodic-disclosure-requirement trigger, Exchange Act 12(g),89 is 
based on the number of shareholders of record, a number that was 
increased in 2012 by the JOBS Act from 500 to 2000.90 A smaller issuer 
utilizing a Rule 506(c) offering would be unlikely to trigger the 
requirements this way for many years, if ever, after the offering. This 
is because the typical shareholder only has a beneficial ownership of 
her shares, with record ownership being held by a nominee of her 
broker, who is the same record owner for many of the broker’s other 
customers who beneficially own the issuer’s stock.91  
 
 87. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. 
 88. Id. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii). 
 89. Id. § 240.12g-2. 
 90. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 
326 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(a) (2012)). 
 91. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of 
Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. 
FIN. 343, 358 (2004). 
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b. Securities Act Section 4(a)(7).  A second route to relatively free 
secondary-market trading is via Securities Act Section 4(a)(7),92 a new 
registration exemption enacted under the FAST Act in late 2015.93 
Under this exemption, as a general matter, a purchaser in a 506(c) 
offering would be able to resell her shares without any waiting period, 
as can each subsequent holder, as long as, in each case, the subsequent 
purchaser is an accredited investor and the seller does not engage in a 
general solicitation. This would appear to allow shares acquired in a 
506(c) offering to be freely traded immediately after the offering on 
electronic trading venues such as SharesPost and the NASDAQ 
Private Market, venues that restrict themselves only to orders placed 
by accredited investors.  
3. Evaluation.  Recall that the essential problem with the public 
offering of truly new securities is the adverse selection that arises from 
a situation of severe information asymmetry: potential investors know 
much less about the issuer and the persons associated with it than they 
do in an offering by an established issuer, and there is no price for the 
same security established in an efficient secondary market to guide 
them. Without solutions to this information-asymmetry problem, the 
market will unravel. A Rule 506(c) offering relies almost entirely on 
the market-based solutions to this problem discussed in Part II, with 
little regulatory intervention to ameliorate any of the shortcomings of 
these solutions.  
a. Signaling.  As we have seen, signaling can fail to solve the 
adverse-selection problem for a number of reasons: issuer claims of 
high quality are not fully credible, issuers have reasons not to disclose 
positive information and so silence does not necessarily mean that the 
issuer is low quality, silence by a low-quality issuer does not reveal how 
much worse it is compared to the issuer that is affirmatively disclosing 
facts demonstrating its high quality, and many retail investors are not 
attentive to the absence of disclosure on each of a myriad of different 
topics nor sophisticated in the inferences that they draw.  
The traditional registration process ameliorates all of these 
problems and the Rule 506(c) offering process ameliorates none of 
them. The traditional procedure increases the expected cost of making 
 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(7) (Supp. III 2015). 
 93. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 76001, 129 
Stat. 1312, 1787–89 (2015) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d (Supp. III 2015)).  
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a misstatement for an issuer by substituting absolute strict liability for 
the much harder-to-prove scienter-based liability. Scienter-based 
liability, as discussed in Part IV, less effectively deters misstatements 
and omissions of mandated information because it makes a claim 
harder to bring, consumes more social resources when litigation does 
occur, and encourages firms to inefficiently distort their internal 
information systems to keep top officials ignorant of material 
information that, if disclosed, would lower share price. By mandating 
disclosure concerning many matters, the traditional registration 
process clarifies the ambiguity that silence has under the 506(c) 
procedure with regard to these matters and makes clear the extent of 
the differences between the superior and inferior firms. Required 
disclosure also makes these many matters more salient to retail 
investors and their advisors than would be the case if they had to sort 
out which firms made disclosures and which remained silent.  
b. Intermediation.  The Rule 506(c) offering process, unlike the 
traditional registration process, does not allow for a firm-commitment 
underwriting. This forecloses an investment bank from lending its 
reputation to the offering by purchasing the securities and reselling 
them to the public. The 506(c) procedure, because it permits general 
solicitation,94 does allow the involvement of brokers, who also can lend 
their reputation to the offering. This is likely to be less effective at 
combating adverse selection than a firm-commitment underwriting, 
however. This is because a broker has much less at stake with respect 
to each deal in which it is involved, so there is less value in achieving, 
and thereafter protecting, a reputation for only marketing-quality, 
truthful issuers. Also, the broker is liable only for its own 
misstatements, not the issuer’s, and claimants must prove the broker 
had scienter. In contrast, the underwriter is potentially liable for the 
issuer’s misstatements under the standard of strict liability subject to a 
due-diligence defense, which encourages the bank to investigate the 
issuer and insist on disclosure of what it finds.  
c. Third-Party Certification.  Third-party certification by 
accountants and other experts is as available to an issuer under the 
506(c) process as under the traditional registration process. The 
traditional registration process creates greater incentives than the 
506(c) process for the certifier to be truthful and fully informed, 
 
 94. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
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however, because it backs up the certifier’s potentially somewhat 
tenuous concerns about reputation in the statements it makes with 
strict liability subject to a due-diligence defense, not just Rule 10b-5 
scienter-based liability. 
d. Buyer Search.  There is little reason to believe that the 506(c) 
offering process does a better job than the traditional registration 
process at ameliorating the shortcomings of buyer search as a way of 
combating adverse selection. It may in fact do a worse job. Although 
the 506(c) process confines purchasers to accredited investors, a large 
portion of all retail purchasers in a traditional registered offering would 
fall into this category anyway. So the 506(c) restriction does little to 
increase the percentage of buyers that would be sophisticated enough 
to do effective diligence on the quality of an issuer. The lack of 
restriction on the number of investors means that the issuer has no 
reason, just to fit the requirements of the exemption, to try to raise the 
total funds it needs from a smaller number of investors who each invest 
more and thereby to create greater economies of scale for investor 
diligence. Most importantly, the Rule 506(c) offering process, unlike 
the traditional registration process, does not require that all investors 
be offered the securities at the same price.95 This means that even if a 
retail investor knows that some large sophisticated institutional 
investors are purchasing shares in the offering, she cannot rule out the 
possibility that the offering appears to them to be a good deal only 
because they are being offered a lower price than she is being offered.96  
e. Conclusion.  Congress, though perhaps not fully aware, was 
starting a brave experiment in mandating that the SEC adopt Rule 
506(c). The experiment may prove that the traditional regulatory 
approach to the public offering of truly new securities has been an 
unnecessary burden. The analysis in Parts I–IV suggests, however, that 
there is a good chance that it will end poorly.  
 
 95. Rule 506(c) offerings permit issuers to offer varying sale prices to different purchasers 
for the same securities, depending on factors such as quantity purchased and the desirability of 
the prospective purchaser as a shareholder. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c).  
 96. This problem could be cured by a contractual provision between the issuer and 
purchasers providing that they are all paying the same price. It is not clear, however, that retail 
investors have sufficient sophistication for this to become a standard term. Retail investor 
sophistication would need to be great enough that satisfying the resulting market demand for such 
a term is more profitable than engaging in price discrimination among investors.  
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The most innocuous scenario by which it ends poorly is that the 
shortcomings catalogued above are indeed important, but these 
shortcomings are recognized by the market from the outset. Under this 
scenario, the Rule 506(c) procedure simply generates little interest by 
issuers seeking to make public offerings of truly new securities.97 
A more harmful scenario by which the experiment ends poorly 
would be for these shortcomings to be indeed important, but the 
shortcomings are not at first recognized by the market. Under this 
scenario, a substantial number of 506(c) offerings funding negative 
NPV projects go forward, offerings that would not have succeeded if 
the issuer had been required to use the traditional registration process. 
Thus the market for 506(c) offerings does not unravel immediately. 
Rather, the unraveling does not occur until an economic downturn or 
the equivalent of the 2001 bursting of the tech bubble. This turn of 
events will reveal the substantial number of offerings that, unknown to 
their investors, were low quality from the beginning.  
A final way for the experiment to end poorly would be for these 
shortcomings to turn out to be less severe than I suggest and for a whole 
alternative system to develop for firms to go public and be publicly 
traded without being subject to either mandatory offering or periodic 
disclosure. Because of this alternative system’s lower private costs to 
issuers, it would gradually hollow out the traditional system where 
issuers are subject to mandatory offering and periodic disclosure. But, 
as discussed in Part IV, the private costs of disclosure are greater than 
its social costs and the private benefits less than its social benefits. So 
the level of disclosure associated with this increasingly dominant 
alternative system would be below what is socially optimal. 
C. Regulation A+ 
The JOBS Act also amended the Securities Act to add to its 
provisions relating to exempt securities Sections 3(b)(2) through 
3(b)(5).98 Under these amendments, the SEC was directed to establish 
what is known as Regulation A+, an alternative system to the 
traditional registration process that would be available for a public 
 
 97. Figures comparing the amount of funds raised during the first two years of the availability 
of this kind of 506(c) by such a method versus by IPOs can be found in SCOTT BAUGUESS, 
RACHITA GULLAPALLI & VLADIMIR IVANOV, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–2014, at 2, 11–15 (2015). 
 98. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401, 126 Stat. 306, 
323–25 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2012)). 
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offering of truly new securities as long as the offering, combined with 
any subsequent offering within twelve months, does not in total exceed 
$50 million.99 Regulation A+ in many ways resembles the traditional 
registration process but is simpler and less burdensome on issuers. The 
SEC adopted final A+ Rules in the spring of 2015. 
1. Required Structure of the Offering.  Under Regulation A+, the 
issuer may engage in a general solicitation to raise money from an 
unlimited number of investors. Unlike a 506(c) offering, a firm-
commitment underwriting may be used in connection with the offering. 
Like with a traditional registered offering, and unlike a 506(c) offering, 
there is no need for the investors to be accredited. There is mandatory 
affirmative disclosure at the time of the offering, but less is asked than 
in a traditional registered offering. There is also a periodic-disclosure 
obligation but again it is less burdensome than standard Exchange Act 
periodic reporting. The standard of liability imposed on the issuer for 
misstatements made in connection with the offering is strict liability 
subject to a due-diligence defense. Underwriters and brokers are 
subject to liability under the same standard as well.  
2. Subsequent Trading of Shares.  Shares purchased in a 
Regulation A+ offering are unrestricted, which means they can be 
traded freely between any two persons as soon as they are purchased 
in the offering, the same situation that prevails with a 506(a) offering 
because of Rule 144 but a year faster. Thus again the issuer can 
maximize liquidity by listing its stock on the NYSE or NASDAQ if it 
is willing to have Exchange Act periodic-disclosure obligations 
imposed upon it. Alternatively, it can have its shares trade on less 
liquid OTCQX or OTCB venues and would only need to provide the 
less burdensome level of periodic disclosure required by Regulation 
A+.  
3. Evaluation.  From the foregoing, we can see that a Regulation 
A+ offering differs from a traditional registered offering in two 
important ways. One is that the issuer, though strictly liable, has a due-
diligence defense.100 The other is that less is asked of the issuer in the 
 
 99. JOBS Act § 401, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2). 
 100. Regulation A+ provides for Securities Act Section 12(a)(2) liability and allows for a due-
diligence defense pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77k. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260. 
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form of mandatory disclosure both at the time of the offering and 
periodically thereafter.101   
a. Lower Liability Standard.  The analysis in Part IV suggests that 
there is little justification for allowing an issuer a due-diligence defense 
just because the issuer is smaller or is raising less than $50 million. 
Regardless of these factors, the misstatement or omission of required 
information would inflate the price of the security above its value. 
Allowing the issuer a due-diligence defense, although not nearly as 
serious a problem as requiring the claimant to show scienter, lessens 
deterrence by making it harder to succeed against an issuer that has 
made a misstatement or omitted mandated information. Moreover, the 
suits that are brought consume more social resources than in an 
absolute strict-liability regime because more issues are at play. The fact 
that the issuer is smaller or is raising less than $50 million is really 
irrelevant and in no way reduces the force of these observations.  
b. Less Required Disclosure.  Whether less disclosure should be 
asked of an issuer if it is smaller or is raising less than $50 million is a 
more complicated question. One argument for asking less is that the 
most persuasive argument in the first place for making an affirmative-
disclosure regime mandatory rather than voluntary—that the social 
costs of an issuer’s disclosure are less than its private costs and the 
social benefits greater than its private benefits—is less compelling in 
the case of a smaller firm making a smaller offering.102 The simple idea 
here is that the actions of such a firm have less impact on the rest of the 
world and so the deviation between its social and private costs and 
benefits is smaller. Less should be required of such a firm above what 
would be required by the regime that the issuer would voluntarily 
choose based on its private calculations of cost and benefit. 
Consequently, the mandatory regime should require less of it relative 
to what is required of a larger firm making a larger offering. It is 
important to note, though, that this argument has no force in terms of 
the minimum level of disclosure needed to avoid adverse selection.  
The other rationale for requiring less disclosure from a smaller 
firm making a smaller offering is that the offering of such a firm poses 
offerees with a less complicated financial proposition and so less 
 
 101. The lesser ongoing reporting requirements are provided by 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11. See 
id. §§ 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260. 
 102. See supra Part III.C. 
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information is needed. In essence, this is an argument that the smaller 
firm making a smaller offering is typically less complicated and so a set 
of questions that is appropriate for an adequate understanding of a 
more complicated firm is overkill for a simpler, smaller firm. Whether 
the current set of questions in connection with the traditional 
registered offering is in fact tilted toward what needs to be known 
about a more complicated firm is an open question, however. Most of 
the questions concern matters about which an investor would want 
information whether the firm was simple or complicated. More 
complicated firms just need to give longer answers.  
D. Crowdfunding 
The JOBS Act also amended the Securities Act to create a new 
Section 4(a)(6) exemption from Section 5 registration for 
“crowdfunded” offerings.103 The SEC adopted rules for this exemption 
effective in the spring of 2016.104 The idea is that capital is raised for a 
project through the pooling of numerous very small share purchases. 
Investors become aware of the offer from the website of a broker-
dealer or a registered funding portal. An issuer can only raise up to $1 
million in this fashion in any twelve-month period,105 and so these are 
offerings that could not possibly be economically feasible as traditional 
registered offerings. Individual purchasers are limited in the amount 
they can invest, with investors with incomes or assets of less than 
$100,000 generally limited to 5 percent of their income and with better-
off investors generally limited to 10 percent of their income.106 There is 
required disclosure at the time of the offering, but it is considerably less 
than what is required under a traditional registered offering or even a 
Regulation A+ offering.107 A crowdfunding offering does not trigger an 
obligation to provide Exchange Act periodic disclosure until the firm 
reaches $25 million in assets.108 No general solicitation is allowed 
beyond the information available on the website posting the offering.109 
The exemption is only for issuers and so the offering cannot be pursued 
 
 103. JOBS Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2012). 
 104. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274). 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6)(A). 
 106. Id. § 77d(6)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 107. See id. § 77d-1(b) (specifying disclosure requirements for issuers involved in small, 
crowdfunded transactions). 
 108. 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-6 (2015). 
 109. Id. 
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via a firm-commitment underwriting.110 The issuer is strictly liable with 
a due-diligence defense. 
The preceding evaluations of the different components of the 
506(c) offering process and Regulation A+ offering process largely 
cover the components of the crowdfunding offering process one way or 
the other. Again, there appears to be no justification for providing the 
issuer with a due-diligence defense. The low level of affirmative 
disclosure, especially when combined with sharp limits on individual 
investments, raises serious concerns that adverse selection will cause 
the market for these offerings to unravel sooner or later, 
notwithstanding the idea that, given “wisdom of crowds,” some 
worthwhile investment projects will get funding that would not have 
been able to receive funding from traditional non-public-offering 
sources.111  
One way of looking at crowdfunding offerings is to note that most 
states provide legalized space for certain kinds of gambling 
notwithstanding the fact that the odds are always against the gamblers. 
Given the existence of a demand for opportunities to gamble, why not 
channel it into an activity that at least might occasionally fund a 
worthwhile project that would not otherwise have received funding, 
especially where income- and wealth-related caps protect the gamblers 
from damaging themselves too much when the gamble does not work 
out? Indeed, it is possible that if investors approach crowdfunding 
offers the same way that gamblers approach a casino or a race track, 
the market will not unravel despite experience demonstrating over 
time that the average offering has a low, or even negative, expected 
return.  
 CONCLUSION 
Absent regulation, the determination of which public offerings of 
truly new securities go forward and succeed at raising funds, and which 
do not, is determined by tort law and the market-determined terms of 
contracts into which offering participants enter. This Article has gone 
back to first principles to answer whether, and, if so, under what 
circumstances, government regulation should be added to the mix. This 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 114 (expressing optimism that the “wisdom of crowds” aspect of internet 
solicitation will substantially mitigate the adverse-selection problems associated with a low-
disclosure offering to ordinary investors); Ibrahim, supra note 41, at 596–98 (same). 
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regulation can relate to what the issuer should disclose at the time of 
the offering and thereafter. It can relate as well to the circumstances 
under which various offering participants should be held liable for 
damages if, at the time of the offering, there were misstatements or 
omissions of required disclosures.  
These questions are live issues because numerous reforms have 
been made in recent years to lessen the burdens of regulation on 
smaller issuers making small offerings. The rationale for lessening the 
burden on smaller issuers is that the cost of the traditional registration 
process has scale economies associated with it that make offerings by 
them too expensive to be worth undertaking. This Article expresses 
skepticism about many of these reforms. Specifically, it suggests that 
these reforms ignore the fact that the core components of the 
traditional public-offering registration process play an essential role in 
countering the adverse-selection problem that inevitably accompanies 
a public offering of truly new securities. The analysis here advises 
against structural changes contained in some or all of these reforms, 
such as eliminating mandatory disclosure altogether, imposing on 
issuers a lower standard than strict absolute liability, and eliminating 
the possibility of underwriter intermediation. A more promising 
approach would be to review the questions that must be answered 
under the traditional registration process. Ones that add more cost to 
the process for smaller issuers than they reduce adverse selection 
should be eliminated. But such regulatory downsizing can only be 
taken so far. A certain minimum range of mandated questions will 
need to be kept if we wish to sustain a market for most offerings of 
truly new securities, at least outside of the small bets at stake in 
crowdfunding. Even if it is possible to scale back the range of questions 
in the way described here, the hard reality is that, for firms below a 
certain size, the cost of what is still required will make a public offering 
and public trading of their shares an impractical form of finance.  
